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1 INTRODUCTION
Accounting standards bodies are currently
refining their proposals for the introduction of
additional elements of fair value accounting for
financial instruments. The ECB has a keen
interest in this debate, as accounting reforms
are likely to have a profound impact on the
banking and financial industry. Furthermore,
harmonised and high-quality accounting
standards could make a significant contribution
to the integration and efficiency of financial
markets in the euro area. On a broader scale,
they could also facilitate European firms’
access to the large international financial
markets, thereby promoting growth. The
interest of the ECB also stems from the
concerns that a wider application of fair
valuations might have adverse effects on
financial stability. The consistency between the
accounting framework and the reporting for
supervisory and statistical purposes is also an
aspect deserving due attention.
This paper1 focuses mainly on the potential
financial stability implications of Full Fair
Value Accounting (FFVA)2. However, it also
addresses certain issues specifically relating to
International Accounting Standard 39 –
Financial Instruments: Recognition and
Measurement. The attention is centred
exclusively on banking, even though it is
acknowledged that similar concerns may arise
for the stability of other sectors of financial
activity, and insurance in particular3. In order to
make what is a very complex issue more
manageable, this paper uses a stylised
comparison between FFVA and the present
accounting rules, herein referred to as the
Current Accounting Framework (CAF4). The
results are preliminary and somewhat
incomplete. They are based on some simplifying
assumptions that may need to be reviewed.
Whereas the findings suggest the need for
further analysis, some relevant conclusions
already emerge.
Section 2 explains the setting for this work,
describing the state of play of accounting
standards in the European Union (EU) and
reviewing the main arguments supporting and
opposing FFVA versus the CAF. A simulation
exercise trying to analyse the potential impact
of the introduction of FFVA on an average EU
bank’s balance sheet is presented in Section 3.
This exercise assesses the different dynamics of
balance-sheet items under FFVA and the CAF
in the face of a number of shocks. Section 4
presents a comparison of the impact of the use
of fair value valuation criteria on a small sample
of EU banks in order to highlight the main items
of the balance sheet on which FFVA is likely to
have a significant effect. Section 5 presents the
preliminary results of an empirical investigation
aimed at gauging whether the shift from the
CAF to FFVA for banks’ trading books has
affected the price volatility of the banks’ own
listed shares. Section 6 then enters into more
specific concerns relating to the consistency
of the current accounting reform (focusing
mainly on aspects of IAS 39) with sound
risk management practices adopted by banks
(especially in the treatment of hedging),
supervisory tools and statistical requirements.
Finally, Section 7 presents the conclusions of
the analysis, stressing that the introduction of
1 By a staff team led by Andrea Enria and including Lorenzo
Cappiello, Frank Dierick, Sergio Grittini, Andrew Haralambous,
Angela Maddaloni, Philippe Molitor, Fatima Pires and Paolo
Poloni. This paper has benefited from the suggestions and
contributions received by members of the Banking Supervision
Committee (BSC) and by members of  an ad-hoc task force of the
BSC composed by Juergen Ardnt, Carlo Calandrini, Thomas De-
Vecchi, Olivier Jaudoin, Maria Leal, Konstataijn Maes, Kalliopi
Nonika, and Jacobo Varela. Christian Fehlker and Michael Olsen
also contributed to the project. Comments on earlier versions of
the paper from Darren Pain, Panagiotis Strouzas and Garry
Schinasi are also gratefully acknowledged.
2 Under FFVA, assets and liabilities are carried on the balance
sheet at their market value, if known, or at fair value, which is
defined as the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or
a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an
arm’s-length transaction.
3 Häusler G., 2003, “The Insurance Industry, Fair Value
Accounting and Systemic Financial Stability”, International
Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets, Speech given at
the 30th General Assembly of the Geneva Association.
4 It is acknowledged that accounting practices may vary
considerably across Europe. However, for the purpose of this
study a generalised framework was considered – the Current
Accounting Framework (CAF). Under the CAF assets are carried
at the amount of cash or cash equivalents paid or the fair value of
the consideration at the time of acquisition. Liabilities are carried
at the amount received in exchange for the obligation. In general
terms, CAF is the measurement basis most commonly used by
enterprises in preparing their financial statements. However, it is
also usually combined with other measurement bases, such as
market prices (namely for trading activities) and lower of cost or
market prices (“LOCOM”).5
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1
Introduction FFVA could have a very significant effect.
Volatility of income is likely to be affected and
the pro-cyclicality of lending might also
increase. However, the positive effect that
FFVA would have on the ability of stakeholders
to take corrective action and safeguard the
safety and soundness of financial institutions is
also recognised. It is argued that any step
towards the introduction of FFVA should be
gradual enough – and consistent across
countries and companies – to avoid magnifying
any systemic disturbances.6
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2.1 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
The need for a reform of the accounting
treatment of financial instruments stems from
several market developments. Financial
innovation has blurred the distinction between
financial instruments and has contributed to the
development of markets for instruments that
were traditionally considered as illiquid and
non-tradable. The rationale for the different
accounting treatment of banking, securities and
insurance services has gradually disappeared as
they often serve the same economic function.
Moreover, as financial institutions have
increased the range of services they provide, so
mixed accounting systems have been developed
that do not seem sustainable in the long run.
As the trading and capital market-related
activities of banks has grown, the accounting
framework has been modified to permit market
valuations for all the instruments held for trading
purposes. The coexistence in banks’ financial
statements of items valued at historical cost
(which are mainly held in the so-called “banking
book”) and others at market values (in the
“trading book”, which is “marked-to-market”)
would be viable only if banks were managing the
two components of the bank portfolio in a totally
segregated manner. But this is not the case, as
trading instruments are increasingly used to
hedge the interest rate risk in the banking book.5
More importantly, the increased reliance of
financial institutions on derivatives contracts,
which in most jurisdictions are recorded as off-
balance-sheet items, has contributed to a growing
misalignment between the information contained
in financial statements and the true risk profiles
of reporting entities. Even supervisory
authorities and central banks are often lacking
information on the effective redistribution of
risks resulting from the extensive use of
derivative instruments such as credit derivatives.
Current disclosure requirements are not deemed
to be adequate to cover this information gap. An
improvement in the quality, coherence and
information content of financial statements
therefore seems necessary in order to reflect the
2 THE DEBATE ON FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING
new financial environment and thereby favour a
proper monitoring of management’s behaviour
by stakeholders.
Within the EU, the push for a reform also
originates in the need to overcome differences
in accounting standards between Member
States. Harmonisation in this area is a crucial
step towards supporting the integration of
financial markets in the euro area and in the EU.
A fundamental building block of the long-term
strategy developed by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), an
independent and privately-funded standard-
setting body based in London, is to bring
financial statements up to date with market
developments. In December 2000 the Joint
Working Group of Standard Setters (JWG),
consisting of the IASB’s predecessor and
national accounting standard-setters, developed
a proposal to use FFVA for all financial
instruments. In the presence of coherent
methodologies for the calculation of fair values,
the proposal would in fact provide a simple and
consistent approach for the valuation of
financial instruments on the books of financial
institutions and across entities with a different
mix of activities.
However, the JWG’s proposal was received
with scepticism by some banks and by
regulators, as credit risk models and valuation
methods of illiquid or non-traded instruments
are not yet suitably developed to extend FFVA
to important components of the balance sheet of
financial institutions, in particular banks.
Concerns were also voiced regarding the impact
on financial stability that might derive from the
increased volatility of financial statements. The
ECB also conveyed its concerns to the JWG in
November 2001.6
5 Jackson, P. and Lodge, D., 2000, “Fair value accounting, capital
standards, expected loss provisioning, and financial stability”,
Financial Stability Review, Regulatory Policy Division, Bank of
England.
6 Fair value accounting in the banking sector: ECB comments on the
“Draft standard and basis for conclusions – financial instruments
and similar items” issued by the Financial Instruments Joint
Working Group of Standard Setters, 8 November 2001.7
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In 2002 the IASB proposed amendments to
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39 –
the crucial standard for the valuation of
financial instruments. The proposal included
the possibility that several components of the
banking book (in particular, loans) could
continue to be carried at amortised cost, whilst
introducing an irrevocable option allowing
financial institutions to measure any financial
asset or liability at fair value through profit and
loss at inception, the “fair value option”.
Further criticism regarding the treatment of
portfolio hedging prompted the IAS to issue a
specific Exposure Draft on this issue. The
debate is still very contentious, namely
regarding the issues of macro-hedging and the
fair value option.
The ECB has voiced its concerns regarding the
application of the fair value option. These
concerns are also supported by the conclusions
of this report. The IASB has acknowledged the
concerns that the fair value option may be used
inappropriately and announced its intention to
limit the application of the option to specified
categories of financial instruments, to introduce
the requirement that fair values be verifiable
and to recognise the role of prudential
supervisors. These proposals were published in
the Exposure Draft, issued in April 2004. The
final version of IAS 39 is expected to be issued
in October 2004.
The European Commission’s interest in the
harmonisation of accounting standards in the EU
is reflected in the strong political commitment to
endorse the standards issued by the IASB. In
May 2003 the EU Council approved a Directive7
which removed any inconsistencies between the
existing Accounting Directives and the IAS, and
complemented a Regulation of July 20028 that
requires all listed EU companies (including
banks) to prepare consolidated accounts in
accordance with IAS from 2005 onwards. In July
2003 the Commission welcomed the endorsement
of the IAS by the Accounting Regulatory
Committee9 (ARC), and in September 2003
adopted a Regulation10 endorsing the IAS, with
the exception of IAS 32 and IAS 39 pending the
finalisation of these standards by the IASB. The
Commission therefore has a strong interest that
the main issues of concern raised with reference
to the wider use of fair values for financial
instruments be satisfactorily dealt with, in order
to move to full endorsement of the IAS.
2.2 POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS AND ADVANTAGES
OF A FULL FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING
FRAMEWORK
Given the relevance of accounting standards
and the lively policy debate, fundamental issues
are raised to highlight both the costs and the
benefits of the wider application of fair value
accounting, which makes it difficult to arrive to
a clear-cut overall evaluation.
Five main drawbacks have surfaced from the
current debate on whether more extensive use
should be made of fair valuations. The first
focuses on the likely increase in the volatility of
income. It can be argued that volatility provides
relevant information and should be duly
recognised in the financial statements.
However, an excessive reliance on fair values,
including for assets that are not actively traded
on liquid secondary markets, runs the risk that
the information disclosed will embody
“artificial” volatility, driven by short-term
fluctuations in financial market valuations,
or caused by market imperfections or by
inadequate development of valuation
techniques. Moreover, for assets and liabilities
held to maturity, the volatility reflected in the
financial statements is artificial and can be
ultimately misleading, as any deviations from
7 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/
349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and
consolidated accounts of certain types of companies, banks and
other financial institutions and insurance undertakings, published
in OJ L 178 of 17 July 2003.
8 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002.
9 Committee composed of representatives of the EU Member States
and headed by the European Commission. The committee has a
regulatory function and provides opinions on Commission
proposals to adopt international accounting standards.
10 Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003.8
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cost will be gradually compensated for during
the life of the financial instrument, “pulling the
value to par” at maturity.11
The cost could be a potential increase in the
intrinsic pro-cyclicality of bank lending, as
more accentuated increases in bank profits and
capital during upturns would support the
overextension of credit, that would then create
the conditions for a deeper and more long-
lasting downturn. This would then also be
exacerbated by the effect that downward
adjustments in asset valuations would have on
bank profits and capital, which would further
restrain their lending. Moreover, another
potential result would be to limit credit
availability to counterparties whose credit
status is more volatile, e.g. small and medium-
sized enterprises (SME). Given the importance
of SMEs in Europe this may have a detrimental
effect on future economic developments.
The second drawback relates to the role of
banks in maturity and liquidity transformation.
The joint provision of deposits and loans puts
banks in a position to provide liquidity on
demand and support the needs of other
components of the financial sector and of the
economy as a whole, also in times of distress.12
This role is fundamentally linked to the opaque
nature of the value of bank assets resulting from
the non-marketability of loan contracts.13 It is
argued that the attempt to introduce fair values
for loans fails to recognise a permanent and
positive feature of banking, i.e. its contribution
to the overcoming of informational asymmetries
between lenders and borrowers. In this line of
reasoning, FFVA might drive banks to forego
their fundamental function. As the accounting
framework would not reflect their “lend and
hold” attitude towards credit extension, banks
would face an incentive to hedge, securitise, or
shift the risk to customers (e.g., via floating-
rate or shorter-term loans) in order to move
towards a matched composition of their
liabilities.14 The potential cost to the financial
system would be that liquidity and maturity
transformation would be more limited in scope,
as interest rate changes would be directly
reflected in the profit and loss (P&L) accounts.
In this perspective, FFVA could encourage
banks to unduly emphasise short-term results at
the expense of long-term customer relationships
and investment needs.
The third drawback concerns the role of banks
as institutions smoothing intertemporal
shocks.15 In all likelihood, FFVA will produce
more positive results during good times, when
asset prices are increasing. This would be
particularly the case if economic agents have an
overly optimistic assessment of risks during
upturns, reflected in a short-term bias in the
calculation of expected cash flows. The upward
revaluations of assets would be reflected in
bank profits and bank management could face
pressure from shareholders to distribute
dividends, including unrealised gains on assets
remaining in the bank portfolio.16 Banks’ ability
to smooth intertemporal shocks would therefore
be adversely affected, with a resulting cost in
terms of both the efficiency and the stability of
the financial intermediation function. The CAF,
on the other hand, applies the principle of
prudence which does not recognise unrealised
gains that may not materialise. In addition, the
CAF makes it possible to build up reserves
during good times, which can then be depleted
during bad times. This would translate into
lower variability in bank income and would
allow banks to insure themselves against
unforeseen circumstances. This intertemporal
11 See Section 3.4 for a more detailed explanation of this issue.
12 Padoa-Schioppa, T., 1999, “Licensing Banks: Still Necessary?”,
Group of Thirty, William Taylor Memorial Lecture on Banking
Policy, Washington D.C., 24 September.
13 Diamond, D. W., 1984, “Financial Intermediation and Delegated
Monitoring”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 51. no 3, pp.
393-414.
14 FFVA’s discounting model makes longer-term assets increasingly
sensitive to changes in interest rates.
15 Allen, F. and Gale, D., 1997, “Financial Markets, Intermediaries,
and Intertemporal Smoothing”, The Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 105, No 3, pp. 523-546.
16 Tax is an added complication given that in several EU countries
accounting statements are used to determine the taxable basis.9
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smoothing function of the financial system
would therefore be better accomplished under
the CAF.17
The fourth drawback is the potential disruption
to market discipline caused by the reduction of
comparability and reliability of financial
statements across financial institutions. Under
FFVA, when there is no observable market
value then valuation models are used. Fair
values obtained by these models should be
based on inputs from liquid markets in order to
reduce the scope for possible manipulation. At
present a variety of valuation models coexist
with varied inputs and assumptions, and this
may significantly reduce comparability if used
indiscriminately across banks and across
balance-sheet items. Furthermore, it should also
be mentioned that the date and purpose of the
valuation is critical in establishing a fair market
value. A valuation is determined for a particular
point in time, and generally should not be relied
upon for other dates. In the same vein, a
valuation is usually performed for a particular
purpose and generally may not be appropriate
for another purpose. For example, shareholders
may value intangibles while creditors would be
more interested in the net realisable value.
Moreover, given the current state of the art,
particularly with regard to credit risk models,
reliability in financial statements could be
negatively affected. Indeed, fair values do not
always convey precise information concerning a
bank’s risk profile, thus hindering market
discipline that requires reliable information in
order to be effective. Misjudgement can trigger
overreaction, which can have a negative impact
on the financial situation of a firm.
Finally, the fifth drawback focuses on the
limited reliability of present bank estimates of
probabilities of default (PDs) for accounting
purposes. In its comments on the work of the
JWG, the Federal Reserve Board18 questioned
the reliability and objectivity of fair values
estimated using market credit spreads and
internal models. Indeed, there are serious
limitations on the use of credit market
information as there is a large dispersion in
observed credit spreads for rated debt within
each risk grade and for a given maturity for
lower-rated debt categories. Even between bank
loans and bond obligations with the same
obligor, differences in observed credit spreads
are large and varied. Meanwhile, internal credit
risk rating systems may produce valuable
information reflecting banks’ risk management
needs, but they are not suitable for managing
loan portfolios on a market-value basis.
Moving to the advantages  of FFVA, the
key issue is the improved scope for
market discipline and corrective action. It is
increasingly acknowledged in both the academic
literature and the supervisory debate that the
discipline exercised by informed and uninsured
investors is an essential complement of
supervisory control. FFVA would in principle
lead to better insight into the risk profile of the
banks than is presently the case, also in the light
of the requirement to move many relevant off-
balance-sheet items onto the balance sheet.
Financial stability could benefit if shareholders,
uninsured depositors and other debtholders are
in a position to readily identify a deterioration
in the safety and soundness of a bank. In fact,
their reactions – either by directly interfering in
managerial choices or by exiting from the
investment – could put pressure on the bank’s
management to take corrective action at an early
stage (see Box 1).
17Freixas, X. and Tsomocos, D., 2003, “Book vs. Fair Value
Accounting in Banking, and Intertemporal Smoothing”,
September.
18 O’Brien, J., 2001, “The Use of Bank Internal Ratings Systems for
Loan Fair Valuation”, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Division of Research and Statistics, December.10
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There are several examples of crises that may have been exacerbated by a lack of market access
to information on embedded losses. For instance, the lack of information and weakened market
discipline may have played an important role in deepening the US Savings and Loans crisis and
the more recent Japanese financial crisis.
US Savings & Loans
Between 1980 and 1994, about 1,300 Savings & Loans institutions (S&Ls), with assets of
USD 621 billion, closed down or received Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) assistance. They had been weakened by a sharp increase in their funding rates and poor
investment decisions. However the accounting treatment may also have played an important role.
Indeed, under the existing accounting framework, the S&Ls appeared to be solvent despite a
deficit on a market-value basis of USD 118 billion.
The S&Ls were exposed to substantial interest rate risk, as 80% of their lending was in long-
term fixed rate mortgages, funded mainly by short-term deposits at market interest rates. When
the average cost of S&L funding rose from 7% to 11% it surpassed the average return on their
mortgage lending. However, the embedded interest rate losses (under the existing accounting
framework) showed up only in earnings each year going forward, whereas under FFVA the
overall loss would have been immediately recognised on the balance sheet through the present
value calculations. Thus, although the S&Ls had already sustained a sharp fall in their expected
earnings income stream, this fact was concealed by the accounting rules and the S&Ls continued
to reflect positive net worth.
In this context, the FSLIC responded by deciding to exercise regulatory forbearance, which
included a loosening of the accounting standards. The S&Ls were allowed to amortise goodwill
from other S&L acquisitions over 40 years, whilst at the same time immediately recognising
income from the acquired assets. Moreover, a plunge in the real estate market also added loan
losses to the already embedded interest rate losses. And to make matters worse, the S&Ls were
allowed to defer losses on loans sold over the remaining contractual life of the asset, rather than
recognising the loss immediately in the profit and loss account (P&L). As a result, S&L
financial accounts completely failed to reflect the already massive existent embedded losses and
appropriate corrective action by stakeholders (or early liquidation) was delayed, thus increasing
the final cost of the crisis to the US taxpayer.
Provisioning practices in Japan
Japanese banks disclose their non-performing loans under standards set by the Japanese
Bankers’ Association (Zenginkyo). The definition of non-performing loans used by Zenginkyo
prior to 1995 was narrow, comprising only loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy plus loans in
arrears for six months or more. However, from 1995 onwards the definition was broadened on
1 “Fair Value Accounting, Capital Standards, Expected Loss Provisioning, and Financial Stability”, Financial Stability Review, Bank of
England, June 2000.11
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two occasions, and from 1998 the Japanese Financial Supervisory Agency (JFSA) finally
introduced a comprehensive assessment of problem loans more in accordance with the existing
accounting standards.
Notably, with each redefinition of problem exposures, the amount of non-performing loans, as
disclosed by the banks, substantially increased, despite the fact that these non-performing loans
were net of write-offs, which were also increasing over the period.
It can be argued that the crisis was indeed prolonged by the delay in provisioning and write-
offs. In 1995 the redefinition of non-performing loans led to their sharp increase in the
disclosed amount, and specific provisions and write-offs also increased substantially, from less
than JPY 6 trillion to JPY 11 trillion.
Thus it seems that following the sharp decline in property and equity markets, provisioning took
a number of years to adequately reflect the extent of the latent damage to loan books. Proponents
of full fair value accounting (with full allowance for expected losses) state that under this
regime problems would tend to become evident earlier, allowing for timelier corrective action.
Indeed, more precise information on the value
of banks’ assets would support market
discipline and transparency, thus favouring the
Box 2
UNDER-PRICED AND OVER-PRICED LOANS
If a loan is correctly priced at origination, the fair value equals the face value. In the absence of
any change in external conditions and in the presence of a flat yield curve, valuations will not
differ under FFVA and the CAF, even if the borrower has defaulted (or the asset has been
impaired). If the yield curve is not flat then some differences can emerge, but in all likelihood
they would remain very limited. However, if for any reason the loan is over-priced, the fair
value will reflect this surplus at origination, and the value of the loan will be corrected
downwards in the following period to coincide with the nominal value at maturity – or at
default, corrected for the loss given default (LGD). A symmetric result would apply in case of
an under-priced loan. This means that phenomena such as implicit subsidies and cross-
subsidisation – in relation to other entities of the banking group or to customers – would be
reflected in bank accounts, provided of course that mispriced loans were correctly fair valued.
In particular, under-pricing would immediately cause a loss to be reported in the income
statement. The likely result would be increased transparency, vis-à-vis the public at large and
the supervisors, which could represent a powerful incentive to abandon these pricing practices.
Another interesting aspect concerns the distribution of this effect over time. While the
cumulated profits will be the same at the maturity of the loan, their distribution through time will
differ substantially. Under the CAF the reported profits will be stable throughout the life of the
loan, but FFVA will give rise to increased volatility, as it imposes reporting a gain or a loss at
origination that is then reabsorbed throughout the life of the loan.
working of private incentives in curtailing
opaque practices of cross-subsidisation (see
Box 2).12
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The second advantage can be seen as the other
side of the coin regarding the cost of banks’
role in maturity and liquidity transformation, as
mentioned above. Indeed, it may also be the
case that banks will take advantage of the tools
provided by financial innovation and rely on
more sophisticated instruments to perform their
traditional liquidity transformation function.
For instance, banks may increasingly rely
on securitisation and other risk-transfer
mechanisms to limit the adverse consequences
of FFVA on the P&L account, while ensuring
liquidity provisions to support developments on
secondary markets for instruments that are
currently non-tradable. If so, FFVA might end
up supporting the increased marketability of
currently illiquid assets. By spreading the risks
through the financial system, it might also have
a positive benefit of possibly increasing
systemic resilience.
The third advantage stresses the potential of
FFVA to limit the scope for pro-cyclicality. At
least for large borrowers, for whom secondary
trading prices or credit spreads can be used, fair
values would reflect the market perception of
credit quality. As a result, adjustments in
valuations would be well understood by the
users of financial statements. Furthermore, as
fair values are based on the notion of expected
cash flows, they are forward-looking in nature
and should embody all the information
available. Hence, FFVA should allow for the
earlier recognition of asset deterioration. If,
however, losses are incurred and measured on
the basis of private information and
discretionary and unquestioned decisions of the
management, provisions and charge-offs may
well come as a surprise to the markets. They
could also tend to be more backward-looking
and pro-cyclical. Provisioning may also come in
big chunks, making investors’ assessment on
the quality of bank assets subject to sharp
adjustments. The perceived opaqueness of bank
behaviour may also lead investors to overshoot
in their reaction to such news. As all this is
likely to occur during downturns, a late
correction in valuations may possibly be
transposed into a tighter credit squeeze that
would contribute to a further slowdown in
economic activity. Furthermore, the potential
for increased volatility would possibly increase
the risk of certain binding financial ratios being
exceeded (e.g. capital requirements or ratios
used in loan covenants that could trigger actions
such as repayment). Financial institutions may
face an incentive to take proactive measures in
order to prevent this from occurring, for
instance by building up additional reserves and
thereby increasing their resilience.
Finally, it may be argued that increased
volatility in accounting magnitudes is not
necessarily a problem if investors correctly
interpret the information disclosed. In
particular, and already under the CAF, market
analysts and institutional investors try to
extrapolate fair valuations from a variety of
sources. If they were completely successful in
doing so, the increased volatility in balance-
sheet items would have no impact on investors’
perceptions19. But even if this were not the case
and new elements were to be conveyed by the
disclosure of financial statements under FFVA,
mature financial markets would be in a position
to appropriately interpret this increased
volatility.
The divergent views regarding FFVA reveal a
different perspective on banking. Under FFVA,
a bank is seen as a bundle of assets and
liabilities, not very different from an investment
fund: what matters is the net asset value, i.e.
what the shareholders could earn by selling the
bank at any particular moment. The emphasis
is on the investors’ (in particular, the
shareholders’) view, in the belief that the main
19 This argument presupposes the existence of markets that are
semi-strong form efficient, i.e. where all available public
information is correctly reflected in the market valuations by
investors. Tests for market efficiency are always joint tests of
market efficiency and the correctness of the underlying asset
pricing model (that is used to compute normal prices and returns).
Modern financial literature rejects this joint hypothesis and
finds that there is substantial predictability of asset returns.
This rejection has driven the quest for more advanced
asset-pricing models, aiming to link the reported predictability
with the expected excess returns that follow from the
asset-pricing model.13
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function of financial statements is to provide
accurate information on which they can base
their decisions. The traditional approach is
more geared towards perceiving a bank as a
going concern, thus emphasising the role of
bank-customer relationships that may escape an
accurate market pricing and the viability of the
bank in the medium term. Within this
framework, the focus is more on the interest of
all stakeholders (in particular creditors, but also
borrowers) that the bank steadily continues to
perform its liquidity and maturity
transformation functions. The different
perspective emerges with greater clarity in the
discussion on the treatment of own credit risk
and on the issue of provisioning practices,
which will be discussed in more detail in the
following sections.
The above outline of the debate on FFVA
shows that the issue is multifaceted and
difficult to address relying solely on hard
evidence. In order to have a balanced
assessment of the arguments discussed above, it
would be essential to understand how this
change in accounting paradigm would impact
the behaviour of banks and banks’
stakeholders. This is not easily done, as no
country has gone so far as to apply FFVA to all
assets and liabilities. However, some elements
for an assessment have been gathered and
provided in this report, which may contribute to
weighing the pros and cons.14
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As a first attempt to understand the likely
impact of FFVA (as compared with the CAF)
on financial stability, a simulation exercise was
performed aimed at gauging how various
shocks would affect the balance sheet of a bank.
The following scenarios were considered: (i) a
significant deterioration in asset quality; (ii) an
unexpected change in interest rates; (iii) the
deflating of a real-estate bubble; and (iv)
significant upward and downward adjustments
in stock prices.
3.1 KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND THE VALUATION
MODEL
In order to make the exercise relevant for the
assessment of the introduction of FFVA in the
EU, the simulation uses a hypothetical bank
resembling as much as possible the asset and
liability composition of the average EU bank.
Of course, this type of analysis is subject to a
“Lucas critique”, given that the balance sheet
structure is taken as given and that the
behaviour of the bank is assumed not to
change when confronted with a reform of
the accounting framework. However, the
simulation remains useful to provide the
background for a discussion of possible
behavioural reactions to the introduction of
FFVA for financial instruments. In fact, if
FFVA is ever adopted, banks will look at the
likely impact on their current balance sheet
structure and decide on changes that minimise
the undesirable effects. Furthermore, a
simulation exercise is also helpful for
understanding the overall effect: even though
the different scenarios are analysed under a
ceteris paribus assumption, it is possible to
combine some of them and have a preliminary
assessment of possible compensating effects.
In order to more accurately reflect the profile of
a “typical EU bank”, aggregate data for the EU
banking sector are considered. OECD statistics
provided the main source of aggregate
information, while additional breakdowns are
calculated using the ECB’s Money and Banking
Statistics. When no other aggregate source was
3 FULL FAIR VALUE ACCOUNTING VS THE CURRENT
ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK: A SIMULATION
EXERCISE
available, the financial statements of some
major EU banks are used as a proxy.
Unfortunately, reliable aggregated data on the
size of variable and fixed rate contracts and on
the relative weight of securities included in the
banking and trading books are not readily
available. Hence the simplistic assumption is
made that the assets are held in equal proportion
(i.e. 50%-50%). Even though the situation
seems to be highly diversified across Member
States, this assumption was checked on a
sample of different banks and appeared to be
plausible20. As the results can be very sensitive
to this assumption, additional national sources
could be used in further refinements of the
work, or different proportions could be
simulated in order to estimate the sensitivity of
the effects to the assumptions. A further
simplifying assumption that might be
reconsidered in future work concerns the
maturity of the loan portfolio. In the absence of
information on residual maturity, an average
maturity of ten years was considered for
mortgage loans, while for corporate loans short,
medium and long-term aggregates as reported in
the ECB statistics were respectively attributed a
maturity of one, three and ten years. Moreover,
partial checks performed in some Member
States confirmed that on the basis of available
information this assumption is sufficiently
robust. Finally, another important simplifying
assumption is that derivatives are not
considered. This is certainly a clear constraint
for the analysis, but the lack of information
does not allow any other possibility.
20 Regarding the size of variable and fixed-rate contracts the
assumption is representative of the situation in some Member
States. Where the relative weight of securities in the banking and
trading books is concerned, the situation varies greatly between
Member States from an equal split to approximately 80% of
securities in the banking book.15
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Structure before the shock
Balance sheet % of assets in € € € € €
Assets
1. Corporate loans 31.0 3,100.0
1.a. Short-term – fixed rate 15.5 1,550.0
1.b. Medium-term 4.7 465.0
Fixed rate 2.3  232.5
Variable rate 2.3 232.5
1.c. Long-term 10.9 1,085.0
Fixed rate 5.4 542.5
Variable rate 5.4 542.5
Specific provisions for corporate loans
2. Mortgage loans – fixed rate 15.0 1,500.0
Specific provisions for mortgage loans
3. Securities 23.0 2,300.0
3.a. Debt securities 18.4 1,840.0
Trading book 9.2 920.0
Banking book 9.2 920.0
3.b. Shares 4.6 460.0
Trading book 2.3 230.0
Banking book 2.3 230.0
Specific provisions for securities in banking book
4. Other 31.0 3,100.0
Total assets 100.0 10,000.0
Liabilities
1. Deposits & interbank borrowing 63.0 6,300.0
2. Bonds 12.5 1,250.0
3. Other 18.6 1,850.0
Capital and reserves 5.9 600.0
Total liabilities & Capital and reserves 100.0 10,000.0
Table 1 Initial balance sheet
Our average EU bank (see balance sheet above),
is assumed to be newly established, thus the
CAF and FFVA should in principle21 deliver
the same picture at the start of the simulation.
Attention should therefore be focused on the
differential treatment in the presence of
different shocks. The box below summarises
the main assumptions to provide a quick
overview of the changes in the various
scenarios.
The approach used aims to estimate how a shock
to an exogenous factor would affect the fair
value of a financial instrument. The information
on probabilities of default (PDs) and losses
given default (LGDs) has been extrapolated
from the results of the third Quantitative Impact
Survey (QIS3) performed by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision to assess
the effects of the proposed changes to the New
Basel Capital Accord. For the sake of
simplicity, a flat yield curve was assumed22.
The fair value of fixed-income instruments (e.g.,
loans, bonds, medium-term notes (MTNs), etc.)
is calculated by discounting the expected cash
flows at the discount rate. The expected cash
flow at a given point in time is the sum of all the
possible cash flows on that date, multiplied by
the probability attached to a particular outcome.
A distinction is made between collateralised and
non-collateralised instruments, as well as
between bullet instruments – whose principal is
repaid in full at maturity – and annuities – which
envisage a constant payment in each period –
thus leading to four possible types of instrument
(see Box 3).
21 As argued in Box 2, this may not be the case if the bank for any
reason under-prices or over-prices some loans.
22A flat yield curve simplifies the analysis considerably. Indeed,
the forward rate curve will be identical to the yield curve in this
case, and hence every change in the yield curve will represent an
unexpected change by definition. This is important, since only
unexpected changes in interest rates will affect the net worth of
banks in theory. If the yield curve were upward sloping, an
increase in the interest rate that is in line with the forward rate
leaves net worth unchanged.16
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– Balance sheet composition reflects average EU banking sector structure
– Variable and fixed rate contracts in equal proportions (50%-50%)
– Maturities (average):
Short term: 1 year
Medium term: 3 years
Long term: 10 years
– Flat yield curve
– Mortgage loans: collateralised annuities
– Corporate loans: uncollateralised bullet loans
– Probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) extrapolated from the Third
Quantitative Impact Survey (QIS3)
Mortgage loans: PD = 0.5% and LGD = 10%
Corporate loans: PD = 1% and LGD = 45%
– Scenario I: One-off deterioration in asset quality
Mortgage loans: PD = 1%
Corporate loans: PD = 2%
– Scenario II: Cumulative deterioration in asset quality
Mortgage loans: PD = 7.48%
Corporate loans: PD = 15.66%
– Scenario III: Interest rate changes
Parallel shift in yield curve: 100 basis points (upward and downward)
– Scenario IV: Real estate crisis
Commercial real estate replaces mortgage portfolio
LGD = 70%
PD = 3%
Interest rates = +300bp
– Scenario V: Volatility in equity prices
Annual price increase: 30%
Annual price decrease: 40%
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where n indicates the contractual maturity of
the financial instrument, CF the cash flows, RF
the risk-free zero coupon rate, and RP the risk
premium. In turn the expected cash flow at a
particular point in time (i.e., the numerator of
the ratio) can be expressed as follows:
where m indicates the number of possible states
at time t and for each state i there is a
corresponding possible cash flow CF(i) with an
associated probability p(i). The formula is then
adjusted to take into consideration the
repayment of part of the principal before
maturity for annuities, while for collateralised
loans the expected cash flow is adjusted in case
of borrower default to take into account the
collateral value. The changes in the probability
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of default (PD) are factored into the associated
probability, whilst the changes in the loss given
default (LGD) are incorporated in the CF.
3.2 DETERIORATION IN ASSET QUALITY
The first scenario considered is an unexpected
and generalised increase in credit risk. The
deterioration in the creditworthiness of the
borrowers will be reflected in the increase of their
probability of default. The main assets that will be
affected by changes in the credit quality will be the
loan portfolio (which comprises 46% of total
assets) and the debt securities held both in the
trading and the banking book (18% of total
assets). First, an analysis is conducted with
reference to a one-off and rather mild
deterioration in asset quality. This makes it
possible to focus on the different timing with
which FFVA and the CAF reflect the increase in
credit risk in the financial statements. Then a
harsher scenario affecting all the instruments is
simulated.
3.2.1 ONE-OFF DETERIORATION
In order to simulate a discrete increase in credit
risk, changes in the PDs of mortgage loans,
corporate loans and debt securities were
considered, using the information available
from the QIS3.
Mortgage loans,23 which represent approximately
15% of assets, are assumed to have a PD of 0.5%,
which is larger than the floor set in Basel II for
retail loans (0.3%) and reflects the approximate
average for retail lending in the QIS3. In addition,
the initial LGD is assumed equal to the floor set in
Basel II (10%). The deterioration in credit quality
takes the form of a one-off increase in the PD
from 0.5% to 1.0%, which can be historically
considered rather mild. The overall impact of this
increase in credit risk is therefore minor. As soon
as the increase in PDs materialises into the
impairment of loans or outright defaults, the
overall effect can be quantified as a loss of 0.04%
of total assets and 0.6% of capital and reserves.
The final effect would be the same under both
FFVA and the CAF: under FFVA, the value of
the assets would be revised downwards in order
to reflect the decrease in expected cash flows,
while under the CAF a provision for the same
amount would be created as soon as the asset is
recognised as impaired, with exactly the same
effect on the P&L. The timing of this adjustment
could, however, differ substantially under the two
accounting regimes.
Corporate loans, which represent approximately
31% of assets, are assumed to start with a PD
equal to 1%24 and an LGD of 45%25. For the sake
of simplicity, these are assumed to be
uncollateralised bullet loans. The one-off
deterioration in credit quality takes the form of an
increase in the PD to 2%, which can be considered
a relatively mild and realistic scenario, consistent
with the results of the QIS3. In this case, the final
impact would be more substantial and the negative
effect on the P&L could be estimated at almost
3% of capital and reserves. Once debt securities,
which account for 18% of the total assets of
our average bank, are also considered, the
additional adverse effect could be quantified at
1.3% of capital and reserves. The overall effect of
a decline in credit quality of the magnitude just
described would therefore make for a final increase
in losses equal to 4.8% of capital and reserves.
Thus far, we have addressed the end period,
assuming that the deterioration in asset quality
would fully materialise. In this case, by
construction FFVA and the CAF deliver exactly
the same outcome. But the interesting aspect is the
different time profile with which the change is
recorded in the bank’s balance sheet. FFVA
recognises the deterioration in asset quality as
soon as the PDs are revised upwards, even though
impairment or default have not yet materialised:
the value of the loans is immediately revised
downwards, as the value of the expected future
23 Mortgage loans are assumed to have an average maturity of ten
years and take the form of annuities. As a reminder, the average
maturity was used, as information on residual maturity was not
available.
24 The current 8% capital charge approximately equates with a 1%
PD when the exposure is uncollateralised.
25 According to QIS 3 results, an LGD of 45% corresponds more or
less to the LGD of a senior uncollateralised loan.18
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Impact of a one-off mild deterioration
Structure in credit quality
Asset item (% of total assets) on assets on capital & reserves
Mortgage loans 15 -0.0% -0.6%
Corporate loans 31 -0.2% -2.9%
Debt securities 18 -0.1% -1.3%
Total 64 -0.3% -4.8%
Table 2 Deterioration in credit quality under FFVA vs the CAF with default
cash flows decreases, and the decrease is directly
translated in the P&L accounts. Under the CAF,
however, the deterioration becomes visible only
when the loans are considered impaired and
specific provisions are created.
Here the crucial point concerns the provisioning
behaviour of the bank under the CAF. If the
bank’s provisioning decisions were taken in a
perfectly forward-looking manner, i.e. reflecting
any change in the expected cash flows, the effects
under the CAF would be exactly equivalent to
those under FFVA, ceteris paribus (namely if
interest rates remain constant). If, on the contrary,
the bank provisions were mainly backward-
looking, there would be a relevant difference with
FFVA (see Box 4). It has to be noted, though, that
a relevant obstacle to forward-looking
provisioning comes from present accounting and
tax regulations. In order to limit the possibility for
management to manipulate financial results,
regulations in most countries tend to give a strict
interpretation of the notion of impairment:
provisioning is allowed only when the losses have
already materialised or when there is hard
evidence that they will materialise soon.
Therefore,  FFVA would allow a timelier
recognition of any deterioration in asset
quality, which might facilitate the exertion of
pressure by stakeholders and supervisors to
take corrective action. From a financial
stability perspective, the timelier recognition
under FFVA is welcome and consistent with
prudent accounting recognition principles. The
sooner the problems are detected, the sooner the
institutions and the regulators can become fully
aware of them and take the necessary actions.
Box 4
CREDIT RISK PROVISIONING AND FAIR VALUE
Under the current accounting framework, credit losses are recognised when it is probable as of the
balance sheet date that some or all contractual payments will not be received. The term “probable”
loss is not precisely defined, but is mostly used to mean that the possibility that losses will
materialise exceeds a certain threshold, generally 50%. Assessments of the probability that some
contractual payments will not be received usually rely upon one or more of the following:
(i) information, circumstances or events, regarding the credit quality of an individual loan;
(ii) statistical analyses, based on historical experience, concerning credit losses associated with a
portfolio of loans; or (iii) the judgement of a bank’s management regarding an individual loan or a
portfolio of loans, notably with respect to the evolution of the economic environment.
This concept of loss is attached to the view that a financial statement should reflect events that
have occurred within the reporting period and should not reflect events that have not yet
occurred. This concept is usually designated under the terms of “incurred loss”. The provisions
made against this risk are thus backward-looking.19
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One drawback of this approach is that it often leads to provisions for loan losses being created
only after the credit quality of a borrower has already deteriorated substantially and the loan has
been assigned a very low internal credit grade, if not classified as defaulted. This can lead to
loans being overvalued and profits overstated during periods when loan quality is already
declining, but default rates have not yet started to increase. It also implies that the aggregate
level of provisions will typically increase only after economic downturns are well under way.
This situation is aggravated if only specific provisions are created. Indeed, the drawback of
backward-looking provisioning could be alleviated if the individual assessment is supplemented
by a group assessment, and general provisions are established when the risk cannot be insulated
and linked to a specified item.
By contrast, the notion of forward-looking provisioning refers to the likelihood of default
embodied in any loan. Provisions should reflect any change in the probability of default after
taking into account recovery rates. This approach is very close to the Basel Committee’s view
on expected losses related to the banking book, to the extent that unexpected losses (UL) should
in principle be compensated for by capital and expected losses (EL) by provisions after they
have been assessed through the internal ratings-based methods.
The notion of dynamic provisioning can be considered a specific extension of forward-looking
provisioning, in the sense that it deals with credit risk over the whole life of the loan (in Basel
II, the calculation of EL is limited to one year). A provision is created at inception based on the
historical probability of default until maturity of comparable loans.
Full fair value accounting is forward-looking by nature since it requires the revaluation of an item
when there is a change in its market price or, in the absence of a market, in the present value of the
stream of revenues generated by the item. Indeed it takes expected loss into account, since a
change in risk at any point in the holding period is reflected in a change in the current fair value.
However, the following elements regarding FFVA should be considered when comparing it to
forward-looking provisioning:
– FFVA does not take the principle of prudence into consideration since it treats unrealised
profits and losses similarly. With forward-looking provisioning unrealised gains are not
accounted for, except on liquid instruments recognised in the trading portfolio;
– FFVA does not distinguish between credit risk and other risks (interest rate, currency, etc.)
that are not linked to the counterparty;
– Credit risk measurements derived from financial markets, i.e. spreads, are imprecise and can
be influenced by factors other than those directly linked to the counterparty’s credit risk (a
more general market risk aversion).
Therefore, as a tentative conclusion, even though FFVA is forward looking, it differs
significantly from forward-looking provisioning with regard to prudence, volatility of
accounts, accuracy and reliability.20
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On the other hand, if the increase in credit risk
is subsequently reversed before the impairment
and defaults take place, then no or limited
impact would be visible under the CAF, while
the full downward and upward adjustments
would be recorded under FFVA.
3.2.2 CUMULATIVE DETERIORATION
In order to assess the impact of a severe
decrease in asset quality, a scenario was
designed in which credit risk steadily increased
for five years. The cumulative default rates
were drawn from the long-term averages
published by Moody’s for the period 1983-
1999, assuming a constant value of collateral.
The five-year cumulative default rates for
corporate loans was then set at 15.66%,
consistent with a credit rating B1 from Moody’s
(BB for S&P and Fitch) with an adverse
economic environment. Following a similar
approach, the cumulative rate for retail
mortgage loans was set at 7.48%.
The mechanics of the adjustment is analogous to
previous scenarios, but owing to the severity of
the deterioration in a five-year time frame, the
impact on capital and reserves is very
significant. The cumulative loss would reach
almost 50% of capital. Under the balance sheet
structure of our average bank, a yearly return on
equity of approximately 10% throughout the
period would be needed to compensate this
effect without depleting capital and reserves.
Again, in order to assess the differential impact
on bank accounts, it is essential to focus the
attention on the time frame for balance sheet
adjustments under FFVA and the CAF. The
overall impact on capital of credit losses, at
Impact of a 5-year cumulative deterioration
Structure in the credit quality of the loan portfolio
Asset item (% of total assets) on assets on capital & reserves
Mortgage loans 15 -0.4% -7.3%
Corporate loans 31 -2.5% -40.9%
Total 46 -2.9% -48.1%
Table 3 Severe decrease in the credit quality of loan portfolio under FFVA or the CAF with
default
least, would be the same under both – it is the
timing of the recognition of those changes in the
accounts that differs, and this may have positive
or negative effects. Under FFVA the
unexpected downward revision in credit quality
would be immediately translated into the P&Ls
over the entire five-year period. The value
adjustment would in all likelihood be more
forward looking than the present provisioning
behaviour of EU banks. The positive
implication would be that corrective action
could be taken earlier, thus preventing
management from adopting a passive attitude
and waiting until the storm blew over. The
effect on volatility may also turn out to be lower
than under the CAF, if the extreme assumption
is made that provisioning only occurs ex-post,
when the losses have already materialised.
On the other hand, two main points can be raised,
which question the appropriateness of FFVA in
presence of shocks like the one simulated here.
First, it is current practice for rating systems of
banks to use PDs that are estimated in a point-in-
time fashion, taking into consideration at most a
one-year horizon. This approach may make sense
from a risk management perspective, as it allows
internal ratings to reflect promptly changes in
credit risk. However, such estimates, would be
fed into the valuation of expected cash flows and
could be revised quite frequently. A large
adjustment of the magnitude described above
could well drive a bank to insolvency, whereas
taking a longer-term perspective and considering
that long-term loans would be kept in the
portfolio beyond the crisis period, may cause a
more positive picture to emerge. Second, the
CAF need not be coupled with backward-looking
provisioning. If the CAF were to be combined
with forward-looking provisioning, which takes21
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a through-the-cycle view on PDs based on long-
term statistical evidence, buffers would be
created that would shelter the balance sheet from
a deterioration in asset quality
All in all, it can be concluded that in presence of
shocks on credit quality FFVA would allow a
more timely recognition of the change in the
risk environment. FFVA would be more
forward looking than the CAF coupled with
backward provisioning. However, if PDs are
estimated at a short-term horizon, FFVA could
also cause some artificial volatility in bank
capital and the adjustments would remain pro-
cyclical. The CAF combined with dynamic
provisioning would, on the contrary, provide
for a smoothing of such shocks, via the use of
buffers accumulated in good times.
3.3 PARALLEL SHIFTS OF THE YIELD CURVE
A parallel shift of 100 basis points, both
upwards and downwards, is considered. The
results of the simulation here depend crucially
on the following assumptions: maturity of
assets and liabilities, proportion of variable and
fixed rate contracts, and the relative weight of
the trading and investment books. Assumptions
on maturity, in particular, may attribute
excessive relevance to long-term, fixed rate
assets, whose value is more sensitive to
changes in interest rates. This could unduly
magnify the impact of the shock under FFVA.
Another important caveat has to be made: given
the lack of available data, it was not possible to
take into account the use of off-balance-sheet
instruments aimed at hedging interest rate risk,
which may play a relevant role in offsetting the
changes reported under FFVA.
The simulated upward shift of the yield curve
would generate losses of a comparable
magnitude under FFVA and the CAF. The
difference would stem only from the loan book,
as under the CAF debt securities in the banking
book are valued at the lower of cost or market
value (LOCOM principle). The value
adjustments, to be reported in the P&L, would
amount to about 22% of capital and reserves
under both the CAF and FFVA (see table
below). This conclusion is dependent on the
assumption that the bank is newly established,
so that the carrying amount equals the market
value immediately prior to the shock. If the
market price before the shock were above the
carrying amount, the CAF would allow the
absorption of part of the adjustment without
showing it in the P&L accounts. This leads to
the other conclusion, which shows a much
greater difference when the yield curve shifts
downward by 100 basis points. In this case, the
profits generated under FFVA would be twice
as large as those under the CAF (24% of capital
and reserves, compared with 12%).
3.4 IMPACT OF AN INTEREST RATE SHOCK OVER
TIME
The results presented in the previous section
(and which, as mentioned above, should be
treated with caution) show that the volatility of
bank income could significantly increase as a
result of the adoption of FFVA. This is also an
example where the contrast between the net
asset value perspective, embodied in FFVA and
the going concern perspective underlying the
CAF can be best portrayed. Again, we have to
take into account the time dimension of the
shock on the bank’s P&L. Assuming that the
assets and liabilities affected by the shock are
Impact on assets (%) Impact on capital and reserves (%)
Adjustments to yield curve CAF FFVA CAF FFVA
100 bp upward adjustment -1.3 -1.3 -21.8 -22.2
100 bp downward adjustment -0.7 -1.4 -12.0 -24.0
Table 4 Parallel shifts of the yield curve22
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neither sold before maturity nor renewed after
maturity, FFVA and the CAF will have to
deliver exactly the same cumulative impact on
the P&L. The reason is that bonds and loans
show a “pull-to-par” movement, as at maturity
(unless the debtor has defaulted earlier) their
market value and fair value will have to equal
par value, irrespective of any value changes that
may have been recorded over their lifetime. Of
course, such a convergence effect does not
work for shares held by the bank as they do not
have a maturity and there is no obligation for
the issuers to repay a nominal amount.
The convergence effect implies that, ceteris
paribus, any immediate change in the fair value of
such bonds and loans as a result of the interest
rate shock will be gradually recovered through
offsetting value adjustments over the remaining
life of the instruments. The following graph
maps the difference through time between profits
and losses under FFVA and the CAF in case of a
100 basis point decrease in interest rates. It
shows that the search for a measurement
methodology that refers at any point in time to the
net asset value of the portfolio substantially
increases the volatility of income for instruments
that are held to maturity, in particular in the
period immediately after the interest rate shock.
It should also be noted that the increase in the
portfolio value as a result of the interest rate
decline would immediately show up under
FFVA, but not under the CAF, thus leading to
the build-up of unrealised gains in the latter case.
A similar analysis can be performed for a
scenario of interest rate increases. This
basically leads to a mirror image of the graph,
with a large negative difference between the fair
value and historical value immediately after the
interest rate increase (although the difference
between FFVA and CFA should be smaller for
an interest rate increase given that the value of
the securities in the banking book will be
revised downwards in both FFVA and CFA/
LOCOM). The value difference is then
recovered over the remaining life of the
instruments.
Chart 1 Difference between FFVA and the
CAF in the P&L account from a downward
shift in the yield curve of 100 bp
























The earlier scenario of an interest rate decline can
be combined with asset quality deterioration,
with interesting results. For instance, if the
deterioration in asset quality coincides with a
recession and an alleviation of inflationary
pressures, a decrease in interest rates (even
though this would not occur as the kind of
parallel shift simulated here) might alleviate
the impact of the value adjustments under
FFVA. In this case, the CAF with perfectly
forward-looking – but not cyclically adjusted –
provisioning might imply a wider correction of
valuations than under FFVA, as offsetting the
interest rate effect would not be taken into
consideration.
3.5 REAL ESTATE CRISIS
For the purpose of this exercise, the
composition of the balance of the average EU
bank was modified, and the mortgage portfolio
was replaced by a commercial real estate
portfolio. The assumption that commercial real
estate represents approximately 15% of total
assets is not as extreme as it might seem, given
the resemblance with situations prevailing in
some EU countries like Ireland and Sweden. A
stress scenario similar to those experienced in
major collapses of real estate markets followed
by banking crises (as in the Nordic banking
crisis) was tentatively designed (focusing23
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solely on the loan book). The reduction in
collateral values of the commercial real estate
portfolio was factored in through a 50%
increase in the LGDs over average values
reported in the QIS3, and the PDs were
increased to about 3%. These shocks were
considered to occur together with an increase in
interest rates of 300 basis points, which is
extreme but still falls short of the increases
experienced in some countries during actual real
estate crises.
The impact of such a shock on the average EU
bank would be very substantial and the
valuation effect would play a prominent role, as
FFVA would immediately capture the effect of a
change in interest rates as well as the downward
adjustment in collateral values. This means that
from the very moment at which the shock
materialises, the bank would experience value
adjustments of such a magnitude as to absorb
more than half of its capital and reserves (54%).
Under the CAF, disregarding provisioning
behaviour, no impact would materialise until
actual impairment or default; but also when
default occurs the effect would be much more
limited (less than half of the FFVA impact, in
fact), because the interest rate effect would be
missing (see summary table below). This means
that in a typical real estate crisis scenario, in
which an increase in interest rates is coupled
with an increased fragility of the borrowers
and a decrease in collateral values, FFVA could
actually contribute to accelerating and possibly
deepening the effect of the crisis. In fact, if
interest rates decrease or collateral values
recover somewhat, the valuation effect under
FFVA would be reversed only after having
generated a capital squeeze that, if it does not
drive the bank out of the market, would in any
case substantially affect its willingness to lend.
However, FFVA’s immediate capturing of the
shock and forward-looking nature may allow
for a swifter correction. Under the CAF, even
the final effect would be more limited, as the
interest rate effect would not be captured.
However, under the CAF the subsequent
correction of banks’ lending behaviour would
tend to be slower than under FFVA.
3.6 SHARP ADJUSTMENTS IN EQUITY PRICES
Finally, the simulation exercise focused on
adjustments in equity prices. The simulation
was based on recent swings, which were large
enough to represent a “stress scenario”: in the
period between 1999 and 2001 an average
annual increase of 30% and fall of 40% of share
prices took place. Although the equity portfolio
only represents approximately 5% of assets, the
impact that surfaced from the shocks turned out
to be substantial, given the magnitude of the
price adjustments.
Under the LOCOM principle that is used in the
CAF, the treatment of equity in the banking
book is asymmetric. Changes bringing the price
below cost call for a specific value adjustment
of the instruments and the change directly
affects the P&L; increases in their market
values do not affect the accounting treatment of
the instruments and do not result in any profits.
This means that a major difference between
FFVA and the CAF will emerge in the case of a
sharp upward adjustment in stock prices. In
fact, the simulation shows that a 30% increase
in stock prices would result in profits of about
12% of capital and reserves under the CAF,
reflecting the adjustment in the trading book,
while under FFVA profits would be twice as
large (24%). Of course, different assumptions
CAF
Impact of real estate crisis FFVA Initial moment After default/impairment
On assets 0-3.2 0.0 0-1.6
On capital and reserves -53.8 0.0 -26.1
Table 5 Real estate crisis
(%)24
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on the relative weight of the trading and
banking book would deliver different results,
but the effect remains striking.
This raises a twofold concern from a financial
stability perspective. First, as unrealised gains
will feed into the P&L under FFVA, they may be
distributed and any subsequent downward
correction in equity markets could directly
impact on capital.26 Second, in the opposite
case where profits are not distributed, the
increase in regulatory capital might fuel an
increase in lending and entail a pro-cyclical
effect.
When considering a significant fall in stock
prices, the assumption that the average EU bank
considered in the analysis is newly established
means that any downward adjustment is
considered as below cost, and so the treatment
would be equal under FFVA and the CAF. The
40% downward adjustment would determine
losses of up to 30% of capital and reserves.
However, if we consider a well-established
bank, the historical upward trend in stock prices
would imply that the equities in the banking
book were accounted for on the balance sheet at
a value substantially lower than current market
valuations. In other words, the bank would have
a substantial amount of unrealised gains (also
referred to as “hidden reserves”), which would
be larger the longer the average holding period.
The evolution of the European stock market
index (Eurostoxx) could provide an idea of the
potential magnitude of unrealised gains.
Hence, if a bank has unrealised gains, even a
downward adjustment of the magnitude
26 Although this concern may be alleviated by the fact that some
countries (e.g. UK) have specific rules on what can and cannot be
considered as “distributable” profits.
Impact on assets (%) Impact on capital and reserves (%)
Price swings CAF FFVA CAF FFVA
30% appreciation in equity prices -0.7 -1.4 -11.7 -23.5
40% depreciation in equity prices -1.8 -1.4 -29.6 -29.6
Table 6 Adjustments in equity prices
Holding period











1997 170.17 167.75 100.00
1998 233.17 229.86 137.03
1999 303.36 299.05 178.27 100.00
2000 418.41 412.47 245.88 137.93
2001 397.44 391.80 233.56 131.02
2002 319.05 314.52 187.49 105.17
Table 7 European stock market returns by holding period
Sources: Datastream, Eurostoxx index.25
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described here could have a very different
impact under FFVA and the CAF. Again,
depending on the assumptions on the magnitude
of these unrealised gains and on the relative
weight of the investment and trading book, the
losses under the CAF could be half as large as
those under FFVA. If we consider a
compounded shock, with the decrease in stock
prices occurring together with an upward shift
in the yield curve affecting fixed income assets
and liabilities, the differential impact of FFVA
with respect to the CAF could even be greater.
The argument concerning unrealised gains
points to a more general issue. Some EU banks
– in particular in countries where the investment
component of the equity portfolio is
traditionally large – may have significant
hidden reserves, which could be realised
whenever a shock generates large losses and
market participants grow worried about the
bank’s solvency. In 2001 it was often argued
that some large German banks were disposing
of long-term shareholdings in order to limit
losses caused by deterioration in their loan
portfolio and low returns from investments in
capital market-related activities. To some
extent, this helped regain the confidence of
investors and responded to market rumours
hinting at more substantial liquidity and even
solvency problems. In the presence of FFVA
this would not have been possible as the profits
resulting from the appreciation of the equity
portfolio would have been reported much
earlier. These unrealised gains might have
already been distributed as, in good times,
shareholder pressure for higher dividends may
be difficult to resist. This example captures the
point on intertemporal smoothing discussed in
Section 2.2. At the same time, it should also be
stressed that unrealised gains do not support a
proper functioning of market mechanisms and
could provide bank management with excessive
margins of discretion which may not be used
solely for the benefit of financial stability. In
order for market discipline to be effectively
exercised, investors need to be adequately
informed, financial statements transparent and
banks required to hold explicit capital to cover
risks rather than use hidden reserves. To this
end, the disclosure of unrealised gains would be
useful information, which could be provided by
banks in the Annexes to their financial
statements.
***
To conclude this section we note that:
– the differential impact of a credit risk shock
under FFVA and the CAF depends on the
assumptions on the provisioning behaviour
that would be followed under the CAF. A
static comparison with the present behaviour
of EU banks, which seems to be biased in
favour of backward-looking and pro-cyclical
provisioning, would suggest that a move
to FFVA might actually represent an
improvement, as it could be analogous to
forward-looking provisioning. However,
the CAF coupled with forward-looking
provisioning would actually deliver better
results from a financial stability perspective,
as it would make it possible to recognise
credit losses in a timely fashion without
entailing the changes in valuations that under
FFVA would be generated by interest rate
movements;
– for other shocks embodying a significant
price component, a major difference between
FFVA and the CAF would surface. In all
cases, concerns emerged that the premature
recognition of unrealised value changes
might aggravate somewhat the effects of the
shock and cause a pro-cyclical impact, even
though the positive effect via better market
discipline and transparency is to be
acknowledged;
– the findings on the relevant impact of shifts
in the yield curve, with all the caveats needed
to interpret the results, raise important
questions as to the incentives banks would
face if confronted with the introduction of
FFVA. In particular, it is likely that they
would take the initiative to reduce the
exposure to interest rate risk, and it cannot26
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be ruled out that such initiatives might also
lead to a shortening in the maturity of
loans and/or to a more extensive recourse to
variable rate contracts. As a result, banks
may be pushed to shy away from their
traditional role, and increasing portions of
liquidity risk and interest rate risk would
be transferred to bank customers, i.e.
households and corporates, which may be
less skilled at managing them;
– FFVA would probably see increasing
recourse to securitisation and other hedging
mechanisms to limit the adverse
consequences on the P&L account. If this
were the case, FFVA might end up favouring
the increased marketability of presently
illiquid assets, spreading the risks through
the financial system and possibly increasing
systemic resilience.
Finally, it should be noted that the simulation
exercise does not capture changes in behaviour
subsequent to the introduction of FFVA, as
banks would readjust their portfolios in order to
minimise the negative affects and better
position themselves to reap the potential
benefits. In that respect, it is interesting to
analyse the case of Denmark, which is the EU
country that has gone furthest in the use of fair
values – although not extended to the loan book
– in order to check whether this has indeed
resulted in increased volatility or instability of
the financial system. The available empirical
evidence shows that Danish accounting
principles have not resulted in significant
income volatility for banks. Furthermore, recent
data point to what can be considered as low
exposure to interest rate risk of the Danish
banking sector. These results raise the question
of whether banks would increase their hedging
activity as a consequence of the introduction of
fair values in order to shelter their balance
sheets from undesired volatility, which would
be positive from a financial stability point of
view.27
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of fair values in
the financial accounts:
comparative analysis
of major EU banks
According to requirements defined by the US
Financial Accounting Standards Board
(Statement of Financial Accounting Standard
107, “Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial
Instruments”), companies listed on US markets
should disclose the estimated fair values of on-
and off-balance-sheet financial instruments
when it is possible to do so. Compliance with
this requirement therefore furnishes fair-value
data for a number of EU banks listed in the US
on the basis of their financial statements for
2000, 2001 and 2002 in which they report fair
values for all financial instruments. The small
sample of banks considered includes ABN
Amro, Barclays Bank, Deutsche Bank, Royal
Bank of Scotland, ING, Fortis, and Bank
Austria Creditanstalt.27
The analysis encompassing a small sample of
banks was carried out at the individual bank
level, without any data aggregation, in order to
avoid smoothing the variability that could stem
from a different portfolio composition.
Attention is focused on the difference in the
valuation of balance sheet items under FFVA
and the CAF, in relation to capital and reserves,
and on the different changes in fair values and
book values between two years, again showing
the difference between the two in relation to
capital and to total assets. The results show that
FFVA has an important impact on some
components of the banks’ portfolios. They also
show that such impacts could also vary
significantly across banks.
On the assets side, the impact of FFVA on
interbank lending would be rather modest, even
though for some banks the use of fair values
produces a revaluation, attributable to the
embedded interest rate gains on this activity
(approximately 4% of capital and reserves). As
expected, FFVA determines quite a change in
the loan book. Both the absolute magnitude of
the changes and the variability across banks are
extremely relevant. For instance, in 2001 the
loan book of Fortis was revalued by more than
40% of capital and reserves, followed by an
important downward revision (-15%) in 2002.
For some banks fair values are not changing at a
4 DISCLOSURES OF FAIR VALUES IN THE
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pace significantly different from that of book
values, nor are they moving in a different
direction. If all the banks in the sample had
moved to FFVA in 2002, the profits generated
by loan revaluation would have ranged from 1%
to 33% of capital and reserves. This evidence
signals that valuation methods could still differ
significantly. It also confirms that income
volatility would in all likelihood rise
significantly unless banks changed their
behaviour when having to measure at fair values
as opposed to simply disclosing values. The
picture is varied when looking at securities
holdings, where the impact is rather significant
for three banks, in particular in the last period
considered, but only moderate for the other four
banks. If one bank (ING) had adopted an FFVA
approach in 2002, the revaluation of the
securities portfolio would have generated
profits of up to 49% of capital and reserves.
Where derivatives are concerned, however,
under the CAF they are recorded as off-balance-
sheet items unless held for trading. Hence the
change induced by FFVA is significant.
Different accounting treatments of derivatives
hamper a proper assessment, but again a
relevant impact can be detected for at least two
banks in the sample. If those banks (Barclays
and ING) had adopted FFVA in 2002, the
revaluation of their derivatives position would
have generated profits of around 18% of capital
and reserves.
On the liabilities side, some interesting effects
are also worth mentioning. For instance, the
effect on deposits and interbank lending would
be heterogeneous across banks, with some
extreme movement. For instance, Fortis reports
a significant fall in the fair value of deposits
below book value, stemming from the valuation
method used for fixed rate deposits. This
difference between fair value and book value
amounts to 33% of capital and reserves.
27 The analysis comprises seven banks, five of which are the largest
banks in their home country (as measured by assets). ABN and
ING are the 1st and 2nd-largest banks in the Netherlands.
Barclays is the largest in the UK, Deutsche Bank the largest in
Germany, and Fortis and Bank Austria Creditanstalt the largest
in Belgium and Austria, respectively.28
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Significant changes occur also in the valuation
of debt securities and derivatives.
All in all, this simple comparison shows that, if
banks do not change their behaviour, the
introduction of FFVA could render EU banks’
balance sheets more volatile. The effect is not
particularly noticeable when measured vis-à-vis
total assets, but it is definitely not negligible
when measured against banks’ shareholders’
equity (SHE). In some cases, substantial
unrealised gains emerge. This raises the
question of the use of such value adjustments,
as dividend distribution would hamper the
ability to shelter future downward movements.
FV revaluation2)
as a % of SHE as a % of assets
Net financial assets1) 2002 2001 2000 2002 2001 2000
ABN Amro 32 38 20 1 1 1
Barclays 4 8 7 0 0 0
Deutsche 5 5 -20 0 0 -1
RBS -1 -10 -6 0 -1 0
ING 44 28 12 1 1 1
Fortis 74 68 -22 2 2 -1
Bank Austria Creditanstalt 16 10 9 1 0 0
1) Net financial assets = financial assets - financial liabilities.
2) FV revaluation = FV - BV .
Table 8 Fair values versus book values29
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The evidence that FFVA would introduce
higher volatility in banks’ balance sheets is not,
in itself, a sufficient reason for rejecting the
validity of the approach. In particular, it may be
argued that financial markets could already base
their valuation on fair values, so that the reform
would only have the benefit of aligning the
balance sheet treatment with the market
valuations that already guide investment
decisions. Furthermore, even if the introduction
of FFVA were to induce increased volatility
in share prices, investors may well be able
to interpret the relevant developments,
disentangling the different sources of volatility.
Of course, this hypothesis cannot be properly
tested, as FFVA has not been introduced in any
country. However, some indication, also for EU
countries, can be inferred from the changes in
the valuation methods for the trading books of
banks.
At the beginning of the 1990s the Capital
Adequacy Directive28 was transposed into the
national legislation of EU countries,
introducing the principle that banks’ trading
books should be marked-to-market. An
empirical analysis has been conducted with the
aim of gauging the impact that a shift from
historical cost accounting to FFVA for the
trading book would have on the volatility of
bank share prices (P) in some EU countries. The
same kind of empirical analysis could in
principle be carried out to check for changes in
the volatility of earnings. However, banks
usually release earnings data on a semi-annual
or quarterly basis. Higher-frequency data
5 FAIR VALUES AND VOLATILITY IN SHARE
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(monthly or weekly) are made available by
major data providers.29 However, these series
seem to display relevant changes only at times
when banks release the data: the intermediate
missing points are filled in using an
interpolation technique, but they seem to lack
economic content. Any exercise aimed at
computing the volatility of banks’ earnings per
share with monthly or weekly frequency will
thus not be possible. Moreover, the sample size
(especially for the period before the adoption of
the FVA) is not sufficiently large to carry out
the analysis on low-frequency data.
The analysis is based on weekly bank equity
indices30 for five EU countries: France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom.
For each country both individual bank data and
a sector index are considered, except for France
where the lack of data means that only the sector
index can be used. The sample period varies
from each country, according to data
availability. Whenever possible, the analysis is
carried out from January 1973 to January 2004.
Subject to data availability, the banks with the
highest market capitalisation included in
national bank equity indices have been chosen.
For each country the date of when the EU
Capital Adequacy Directive was transposed into
national legislation was identified (see Box 5).
28Council Directive 93/6/EEC, enacted on 15 March 1993.
Nevertheless, changes in accounting regulations concerning the
treatment of so-called held-for-trading securities had already
been implemented in some of Member States.
29 Thomson Financial Datastream, for example.
30 As provided by Datastream.
Box 5
WHEN DID BANKS START TO MARK-TO-MARKET THEIR TRADING BOOKS?
The empirical analysis of banks’ share volatility depends critically on the date at which the
change in accounting regulation was carried out in each country. In principle, a distinction could
be made between the de jure and de facto change in accounting standards, i.e. distinguishing
between when a new regulation was introduced in the country’s legal framework and when the
banks actually started to adopt the new standards. For the purpose of this study it was generally
accepted that major banks (such as the ones included in the indices) would adopt the new30
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regulations as soon as possible, i.e. starting the next fiscal year. The dates were chosen as
follows.
In France, the accounting trading book was created by regulation at the beginning of 1990, and
thus a dummy variable was introduced starting in January 1991. In Germany, accounting
regulations demand valuation at historical costs of banks’ assets and liabilities. However,
Paragraph 252 (2) of the German Commercial Code, which was introduced in 1991, allows
exceptions to this general principle and thus prompted the development of fair value
measurement for banks’ trading books. A dummy variable was introduced in January 1992. In
Spain, the held-for-trading category of securities, which could be valued using market values,
was introduced in accounting regulations in September 1989; thus the dummy variable has a
value of 1 starting in January 1990. In Italy the same definition was introduced in 1992 and the
dummy variable takes the value of 1 starting from January 1993. In the United Kingdom, the
British Bankers Association Statements of Recommended Practice (BBA SORP) was the first
formal guidance recommending that trading book securities be marked-to-market. It was issued
in 1990, with banks encouraged to adopt its recommendations as soon as practicable or in the
first accounting period beginning on or after January 1993 at the latest. However, it was already
common practice for banks with major securities trading operations (since the Stock Exchange
“Big Bang” of 1986) to use market valuations. Thus, the empirical study has been carried out
using two different dummy variables, the first one starting in January 1987 and the second one
starting in January 1991.
After computing returns as the log differences
of two consecutive price index observations, a
Generalised Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is fitted on
each series32. This makes it possible to estimate
their time-varying volatilities. Within this
econometric framework a dummy variable is
used to test whether there was a significant
increase in volatility following the adoption of
fair values for the trading book. In addition, a
control variable for the total market volatility is
introduced, also modelled using a GARCH
process (see Box 6).
Box 6
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
This box describes the methodology used to test whether the change in the accounting standards
concerning the reporting of financial instruments has had an impact on the volatility of banks’
share prices.
The empirical analysis is carried out on logarithmic differences of banks’ price indices, (Pi,t),
including dividends, where i = l,...,n  represents the ith asset under consideration. Log
differences in P’s makes it possible to compute (compounded) total returns, ri,t.
First, a test is run to determine whether the returns process can be explained by autoregressive
and moving average components. If the coefficients associated with these terms are
significantly different from zero, they are included among the explanatory variables, otherwise
they are discarded from the mean equation.
32 Since equity price indices are non-stationary time series,
empirical analysis is carried out on returns since these  are
stationary series.31
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The mean equation for returns can be written as follows:
(1) t , i q t , i q , i t , i , i p t , i p , i t , i , i , i t , i b b r a r a a r                  1 1 1 1 0 .
Error terms i,t’s are assumed to have zero mean and a time-varying variance, hi,t. The adopted
variance process, (which turns out to be the variance of returns), is conditional on a time-
varying information set and, as such, is updated as long as new information becomes available.
Therefore it takes into account the events that affect equity markets. The linear Generalised
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model originally proposed by Engle
(1982) and Bollerslev (1986) is used:
(2) 1
2
1          t , i i t , i i i t , i h h .
This form of the GARCH model, however, is not able to capture the so-called asymmetric
volatility phenomenon. Typically volatility tends to increase more after negative return shocks
than after positive return shocks of the same magnitude. Two different models, the leverage
effect hypothesis (Black, 1976, and Christie, 1982) and the volatility feedback effect (Campbell
and Hentschell, 1992) can help to explain this phenomenon. The leverage effect states that after
an unexpected decrease in the equity value the debt-to-equity ratio of a firm tends to increase.
This, in turn, will induce an increase in the riskiness (volatility) of equities which will surge as
well. An alternative explanation is that after a negative shock and the consequent increase in
equities variance, the expected return must become sufficiently high to compensate the investor
for the increased volatility. This movement in prices will thus in itself create more volatility
(volatility feedback). These two explanations for asymmetries in volatility are not mutually
exclusive, and can be at work at the same time (see also Bekaert and Wu, 2000).
In order to take into account the asymmetry effect, equation (2) is therefore enriched with an






1 0                 t , i i t , i t , i i t , i i i t , i h I h .
The indicator function I(i,t < 0) is equal to one if i,t  is negative, and equal to zero otherwise.
Assume that i turns out to be positive (negative). When i,t  is negative, I(i,t < 0) is equal to
one and volatility actually goes up (down). Conditional volatility, instead, does not change for
positive innovations, since I(i,t < 0) will be equal to zero.
Now assume that at a certain point in time, , with  < t, the accounting requirements for the
disclosing of financial assets changes. This change may be reflected in the variance hi,t. This
hypothesis can be tested by checking whether the intercept of the GARCH model changes with






1 2 1 0                   t , i i t , i t , i i t , i i t , i i , i , t , i h I d h ,
where di,t represents a dummy variable which takes on value zero for  < t, i.e. before the change
in the accounting standards, and value one otherwise, i.e. for the whole period after the change32
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has occurred. If 2,i is significantly different from zero, then this will indicate that the process
governing volatility has changed.
To check for possible changes in the intercept attributable to changes in the volatility of the
whole market, the GARCH process (4) is modified as follows:




1 2 1 0 ,
where hm,t is the time varying variance associated with the whole market m. Equation (5) is
jointly tested with the mean equation (1) to asses the impact of a change in accounting standards
on banks’ return volatility.
The variance for the whole market, hm,t, is calculated using a procedure similar to that used for
hi,t. First, the returns on the whole market index are computed, and are then modelled in line
with equation (1). Second, error terms are assumed to follow a GARCH process similar to that
of equation (3). Finally, hm,t is recovered and plugged into equation (4).
For each country the empirical analysis is
carried out on an aggregate bank index and/or
individual bank indices. For each time series,
two different equations are estimated: one
contains as a control variable the whole market
variance while the other does not. The fourth
column in the following table shows
coefficients of the dummy variables which
indicate whether there has been a switch in
volatility after the adoption of the FFVA
standards. P-values are reported in parentheses.
T-statistics are shown in the last column.
In general, several different components are
used for the valuation of equity prices. Apart
from the well-known relationship between
current stock prices and a combination of
expected future dividends and stock returns,
the valuation of a stock price index for banks
may also depend on the accounting standards.
With historical cost accounting, asset valuations
have to rely on inferences regarding some items
in the banks’ balance sheets. This will
inevitably increase the uncertainty associated
with those items. On the other hand, under
FFVA this type of uncertainty does not play any
role in asset valuation. At the same time,
however, fair value may result in the increased
volatility of future cash flows. Therefore, when
accounting standards change from the CAF to
FFVA, the overall effect on the volatility of
banks’ equity returns is uncertain. Moreover, as
argued at the beginning of this section, since
investors may base their valuations on fair
values independently of the accounting
standards, it would not be surprising to observe
negligible changes in volatility when moving
from one accounting regime to another.
Empirical evidence shows that the change in
volatility of returns is almost never significant
except for IKB in Germany, Banco Santander in
Spain and Standard Chartered in the United
Kingdom. Where bank indices are concerned,
only the UK index is sensitive to the change in
accounting standards. Controlling for the
market returns does not improve significance.
These results need to be interpreted with
caution for at least three different reasons.
First, the choice of the cut-off dates at which
banks changed from one accounting standard to
the other is far from clear-cut. Banks in the
same country may have started to implement fair
valuations of financial assets at different times
and for a different set of instruments. Second,
towards the end of the 1980s and at the
beginning of the 1990s the relative weight of33
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Countries market variables t-stats








































United Kingdom Bank of Scotland yes (since 1987) -0.73 -1.10
(0.27)
yes (since 1991) -0.38 -0.83
(0.41)
no (since 1987) 0.73 -1.48
(0.14)
no (since 1991) -0.52 -1.47
(0.14)
Barclays Bank yes (since 1987) 0.50 1.00
(0.32)
yes (since 1991) 0.79 1.52
(0.13)
no (since 1987) -0.05 0.26
(0.79)
no (since 1991) -0.13 -0.71
(0.48)
Table 9 Results of the FVA analysis using GARCH models for the volatility of returns34
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the trading book – to which the FFVA standard
applied – vis-à-vis the overall stream of income
was relatively modest. Finally, even though
volatility had increased significantly and
permanently after the adoption of the FFVA, it
would be important to analyse to what extent
investors priced in this incremental volatility in
the context of an asset pricing model. This
would make it possible to check whether the
higher variability embodies, from the investors’
point of view, information about additional
risk. The lack of a significant change in the risk
premium would indicate that investors interpret
the additional variation as being in line with the
new reporting requirements. Therefore, the
additional volatility would not lead to a re-
allocation of capital away from the bank’s
equity. Further investigation is thus needed to
address the aforementioned points.
Table 9 Results of the FVA analysis using GARCH models for the volatility of returns (cont’)
Control for the Coefficients of dummy
Countries market variables t-stats
United Kingdom STD Chartered yes (since 1987) 15.60 4.56
(0.00)
yes (since 1991) 0.88 1.85
(0.06)
no (since 1987) 0.84 1.12
(0.26)
no (since 1991) 0.30 0.77
(0.44)
Abbey Bank yes (since 1991) 0.47 1.46
(0.14)
no (since 1991) -0.08 -0.50
(0.62)
Bank Index yes (since 1987) 2.01 1.91
(0.05)
yes (since 1991) 2.34 2.14
(0.03)
no (since 1987) 0.11 0.66
(0.50)
no (since 1991) 0.02 0.14
(0.88)






























6.1 CONCERNS REGARDING HEDGING ACTIVITIES
Until now, the analysis of the effects of FFVA
on financial stability has been conducted by
comparing the full fair value for all financial
instruments to the present setting, checking
whether the potential move to FFVA could
create adverse effects on financial stability. In
this section the focus will be shifted to the
impact of IAS 39, which can be understood as a
partial application of fair value accounting.
Indeed, IAS 39 includes a proposal which gives
institutions the possibility to irrevocably apply
fair valuations to any financial instrument at
inception – the so-called “fair value option”.32
An important improvement of IAS 39 relates to
the issue of the comprehensiveness of financial
accounts, since these should provide a complete
picture of the reporting company. One of the key
areas in which the proposals of the IASB provide
a significant improvement over the CAF regime
is the recognition on the balance sheet of
business that is now recorded only
off-balance sheet, in particular derivatives
transactions. There is an increasing awareness
that the risk exposures of financial intermediaries
cannot be appropriately assessed in the absence
of reliable and comparable information on
derivatives business. It is now well known that
derivative contracts can be used not only to hedge
risks but also to increase leverage, and the
resulting increase in risk needs to be
appropriately recognised on the balance sheet
(see Box 7). Furthermore, the increased recourse
to credit risk transfers has raised questions as to
the effective redistribution of risks throughout
the financial system.
A mixed accounting framework introduces
artificial volatility in reported earnings that only
incompletely reflects the economic hedging
strategies of the reporting company and thus
would not mirror the overall reduction in the
risk exposure. Under FFVA, hedging activities
would not represent a particular problem, as
both the hedged and the hedging instruments
would be fair valued. Changes in opposite
directions would be automatically offset and
6 IAS 39: CONSISTENCY WITH MARKET PRACTICES,
SUPERVISORY TOOLS AND STATISTICAL
REQUIREMENTS
only the net change in value would be reflected
in the P&L. However, under the present mixed
system a problem arises, as derivative
instruments are commonly used to hedge risks
stemming from assets and liabilities that are
valued at their historical values. Hence, in the
absence of specific treatment, changes in the
relevant risk factor would only be reflected in
the value of the derivative, which would be fair
valued, and not in the hedged instrument. This
would introduce artificial volatility in bank
profits. In addition, it would not reflect the risk
management tools that are applied by banks and
would fail to provide a clear and consistent
picture of the risks involved.
Hence, a specific accounting treatment – “hedge
accounting” – was devised in order to address
this issue. Hedge accounting either defers or
brings forward the recognition of gains and
losses in the profit and loss account so that the
gain or loss from the hedged instrument is
recognised at the same time as the offsetting
gain or loss from the hedging instrument.
In this context, IAS 39 defines two types of
hedges, the fair value hedge, which protects
against fluctuations in the value of balance sheet
items, and the cash flow hedge, which protects
future revenues or transactions. Changes in value
of fair value hedges must be recognised in the
income statement for both the hedged item and
the hedging instrument, while changes in value
of cash flow hedges, concerning the hedging
instrument only, are taken to equity.
Initially, the IASB envisaged the application of
fair value hedge accounting only at the micro
level (i.e. instrument by instrument). In
response to concerns of the banking industry,
however, amendments were proposed in August
2003 to allow for fair value hedge accounting
for portfolio hedges of interest rate risk (so-
32 It should be noted, however, that the IASB is currently revising
this standard in order to introduce a confined application of the
fair value option to a specific set of financial instruments. On
21 April 2004, the IASB issued an “Exposure Draft of proposed
amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and
measurement the fair value option”, with a 90 day current period.36
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Box 7
THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF OFF-BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS ON INTEREST RATE RISK EXPOSURES: AN
EXAMPLE FROM BELGIUM
The figure below represents the report in which the assets and liabilities of all Belgian banks
have been assigned to ten different time bands according to their remaining time-to-repricing
(December 2003, source: Belgian Prudential Regulatory Scheme A, Banking and Finance
Commission).
When restricting our attention to on-balance-sheet assets and liabilities only, we observe that
net assets are typically negative at the short end and positive at the long end, implying that
Belgian banks act as maturity and liquidity transformers.
When we take the net off-balance-sheet positions into account (e.g., options, forward rate
agreements, interest rate swaps), we conclude that the total net exposure of banks across time-
to-repricing time bands is affected. The effect over different time bands varies greatly. In
particular, net off-balance-sheet positions seem to partially reduce all time band imbalances that
exist at the long end of the time-to-repricing curve. While the impact is not extremely large, it
should be noted that these are total mismatches over all Belgian banks, and the effects might be
more significant were we to focus on an individual bank. At the short end, the impact is less
consistent, although off-balance-sheet net positions can clearly be seen to increase the
imbalance in time band “1 to 3 months”.
Of course, the figure below only yields a first-order approximation of the impact of off-balance-
sheet instruments on the interest rate risk exposure. More specifically, the exercise might be
sensitive to underlying assumptions and data limitations. First, the time band data does not
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make it possible to distinguish between trading and banking book positions. Second,
imbalances within a given time band do not surface. Third, the positions are reported on a solo
basis, meaning that the consolidated balance sheet might look different. Fourth, option
positions are included at their delta value. Fifth, savings deposits may be assigned to certain
time bands according to their effective or behavioural maturity, instead of being classified into
the indeterminate time band. Sixth, all positions in foreign currencies were converted into euro
and added up (without allowing for compensations). Seventh, options risks in savings deposits
and prepayment risks in loans are not taken into account.
called “macro-hedges”), which would move
closer to banks’ prevailing risk management
practices. Indeed, in most European countries
this management technique is used as a basis for
the hedging accounting treatment, allowing the
bank to recognise the effect of this technique in
the accounts.
IAS 39 also stipulates that derivative
instruments may be used as hedging
instruments, and requires all derivative
financial instruments to be measured at fair
value. The application of these measurement
rules leads to differences in treatment
depending on the nature of the financial
instrument as opposed to management intent. In
addition, the choice between using a fair value
hedge and a cash flow hedge in economically
equivalent situations would render very
different impacts on net income or equity.
The accounting treatment of banks’
management of interest rate risk that involves
macro-hedges needs further consideration. In
economic terms, it does not matter whether a
derivative instrument is considered a fair value
hedge or a cash flow hedge, while IAS 39
imposes different requirements for the
recognition under the two types of hedge
accounting. Concerns have been raised that
portfolio hedging strategies, which form part of
banks’ risk management strategies, would
either be not at all recognised in hedge
accounting, thus giving rise to volatile P&L
statements, or would only qualify for cash flow
hedge accounting. Cash flow portfolio hedge
accounting requires banks to measure the
hedging instrument (the financial derivative) at
fair value, with resulting changes in its value
debited or credited in equity. Through time this
equity item will be gradually recycled in P&L.
Hence, this accounting treatment results in
increasingly volatile equity positions. Some
banks expressed their concern that cash flow
hedging would generate “artificial volatility” in
equity (see Box 8).
Box 8
CASH FLOW HEDGE VERSUS FAIR VALUE HEDGE: IMPACT ON THE BALANCE SHEET
The following example provides a comparison of the potentially differing impacts of applying
cash flow hedge accounting treatment or fair value hedge accounting treatment. The example
uses a simplified balance sheet. The following additional assumptions were made:
– concerning the contractual maturities and repricing dates schedule. Period 2 is three years
(duration 2.5) and Period 3 is five years (duration 4.5);
– all deposits are demand deposits, reimbursed on demand or in a brief period of time and have
the following expected (behavioural) maturities: 800 for period 1; 1,100 for period 2 and
5,600 for period 3;38
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– demand deposits bear a 0% interest rate;
– hedging instruments are financial derivatives which constitute a perfect hedge;
– the entity successively invests the amounts of demand deposits at a short-term horizon with
short-term interest rates.
It should be noted that the IASB has established that demand deposits cannot qualify for fair
value hedge accounting beyond the shortest period in which the counterparty can demand
payment. Demand deposits constitute a significant part of banks’ liabilities, usually bearing a
null or a very low interest rate, which can be considered as a fixed rate.
Many banks manage interest rate risk by referring to behavioural maturities. In the following
table the assets and liabilities are set in the timing schedule according to their expected
maturities, which is relevant for risk management purposes. In this example, the timing of the
deposits has been modified. Indeed, while individual demand deposits are seemingly very
volatile, taken aggregately they have historically proved to be fairly stable.
Contractual maturities
Balance sheet Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Loans to customers
Short-term 3,500 3,500
Medium & long-term -  variable rate 1,750 300 300 1,150
Medium & long-term - fixed rate 1,750 500 300 950
Mortgage loans 3,000 300 300 2,400
10,000 5,550 900 3,550
Deposits 7,500 7,500
Interbank lending 1,500 1,500
Equity (capital+ reserves) 1,000 1,000
10,000 9,000 0 1,000
Note: Figures in euro.
Table A Balance sheet with contractual maturities
Note: Figures in euro.
Expected maturities
Balance sheet Period 1 Period 2 Period 3
Loans to customers
Short-term 3,500 3,500
Medium & long-term – variable rate 1,750 300 300 1,150
Medium & long-term – fixed rate 1,750 500 300 950
Mortgage loans – fixed 3,000 300 300 2,400
10,000 4,600 900 4,500
Deposits 7,500 800 1,100 5,600
Interbank lending 1,500 1,500
Equity (capital + reserves) 1,000 1,000
10,000 2,500 1,100 6,600
Table B Balance sheet with expected maturities39
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Medium & long-term – variable rate 1,750.0





Swap – Period 2 27.5
Swap – Period 3 252.0
Equity (capital + reserves) 1,000.0 720.5
of which:
Initial equity 1,000.0
Other comprehensive income – Swap – Period 2 -27.5
Other comprehensive income – Swap – Period 3 -252.0
P&L (Net income) 0.0
Total liabilities & equity 10,000.0
Impact on equity -28.0%
Impact on P&L 0.0%
Table C Impact on the balance sheet from the casch flow hedge
Demand deposits create risk for the interest rate margin. The interest rate margin would
fluctuate between the short rate market rates and a fixed rate, thus resulting in exposure to
interest rate risk. In order to hedge this risk, banks enter into swaps paying the short-term
floating rate and receiving the fixed rate.
As can be seen in the preceding table, the bank is liability-sensitive in Periods 2 and 3. According to
the IAS 39 framework, hedging of net risk positions is not allowed. To hedge the interest rate
margin risk resulting from demand deposits it is assumed that the bank will enter into two swaps of
1,100 and 5,600. The swaps are only recorded off-balance sheet at inception and have nil value.
If, subsequently, interest rates increase by 100 basis points, the fair value of the swaps would
change as follows:
Period 2 swap: 27.5 (1,100*0.01*2.5)
Period 3 swap: 252.0 (5,600*0.01*4.5)
Recognition under cash flow hedge accounting:
The hedging instrument is measured at fair value, and changes are recognised in equity. Hence,
with the changes in interest rates the change in fair value of the swap is recognised along with
the consequent accounting loss recognised in equity. The balance sheet would be as follows:
In this situation, the increase in interest rates of 100 basis points would reduce equity by almost
30%.40
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Any accounting rules that result in volatile
equity positions in banks should be carefully
considered. Market price volatility may feed
into volatile equity positions, which may trigger
supervisory action if minimum requirements are
not met. In case of temporary price movements,
such consequences of accounting rules for
banking supervision might have a pro-cyclical
effect in that market volatility and supervisory
action would be linked in an automatic way.
This would clearly be undesirable.
The main concern about the new proposals on
macro-hedge accounting relates to the treatment
of demand deposits.33 Indeed the proposed new
accounting rules on macro-hedging do not allow
demand deposits to qualify for fair value hedge
accounting. Clearly, for depositors the value of
demand deposits is the nominal value.
However, the behavioural maturity of core
deposits differs from their contractual maturity
and banks tend to take this into consideration in
their risk management practices. Even though
sight deposits are redeemable on demand, they
are typically stable liabilities under a “going
concern” scenario. The liquidity transformation
role of banks stems from their ability to collect
funds from a very disparate set of savers. This
minimises the likelihood of a sudden and
contemporaneous withdrawal of funds, which
would only arise in the event of panic or
systemic crises. The latter are normally
addressed by other tools (including deposit
insurance and emergency liquidity assistance),
which make it possible to “lock in” the funds in
illiquid investments. In the management of
interest rate risk, therefore, banks tend to use
behavioural maturities for deposits, in order to
hedge only the residual risk. Of course this
does not mean that banks should be left with
absolute discretion in their decisions on the
maturity allocation of deposits. Some criteria,
consistent across credit institutions, would
need to be developed. In this respect,
convergence would best be achieved between
the supervisory principles for the management
of interest rate risk and the criteria defined by
accounting standard-setters. Cooperation
between the IASB and the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision could appropriately lead
in this direction.
It is frequently argued that the introduction in
the US of accounting principles akin to those
embedded in IAS 39 has not created major
problems. However, the greater relevance of
demand deposits in the EU vis-à-vis the US (see
Box 9) suggests that the effect on EU banks’
practices merits further consideration.
The draft of IAS 39 also introduced an option
enabling any financial instrument to be
designated at origination for measurement at
fair value. The introduction of the fair value
option does not seem justified purely on
transparency grounds. First, no mechanism is
foreseen in the draft exposure to ensure that fair
values are reliably measured. The total freedom
left to financial intermediaries to choose which
instruments to fair value, coupled with the lack
of oversight on the valuation models adopted,
would adversely affect the information content
of financial statements. Second, because of the
unreliability of fair values as well as the very
fact that not all institutions would use fair
valuations – for a limited and heterogeneous set
of instruments – the comparability of balance-
sheet information across financial institutions
could be severely jeopardised. Moreover, from
a broader perspective, comparability at the
international level could also be compromised,
as there is no such option available under US
GAAP. From the financial stability viewpoint,
the implications of the fair value option depend
on the extent to which the option would be used.
The absence of any control over the process
must be of concern, as some banks may be
pressed by institutional investors, rating
agencies and market analysts to gradually
extend the area of instruments to be fair valued,
and this could lead other banks to follow suit.
The move towards FFVA could therefore
proceed unchecked, driven by agents that are
not best placed to fully appreciate the
33 Deposits can only qualify for fair value hedge accounting beyond
the shortest period in which the counterparty can demand
payment.41
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STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE US AND EU BANKING SECTORS1
Underlying structural differences between the US and European banking sectors have
influenced the current debate regarding the new accounting rules set forth in IAS 39, namely
pertaining to the wider application of fair values and the treatment of demand deposits.
First, the US financial system can be characterised as market-based, while the EU is more bank-
based. Indeed, the total lending business of deposit-taking banks ascends to about 130% of
GDP in Europe, while it represents merely 20% of US GDP. Thus, lending is more important
for European banks and one of the major limitations of applying fair value accounting is the lack
of reliability of loan valuations. Moreover, while in the euro area the total size of the equity and
bond market is roughly comparable to the amount of deposits, it is eight times larger in the
United States. Considerable core demand deposits exist and are a fundamental characteristic of
the European banking sector. These deposits remain on the balance sheet for longer periods,
even when they are legally available to the depositors on demand or at very short notice. They
are in this sense equivalent to long-term savings and are treated as such by banks, in accordance
with sound interest rate risk management techniques as explained in the consultative document
of the Basel Committee Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk.
Second, the rate of savings is relatively low in the United States, not exceeding 3%, while it
fluctuates around 12% in Europe. The savings market is also more disintermediated in the
United States than in Europe. Indeed, Americans invest their savings in stocks and mutual funds
while Europeans visit their banks to invest in fixed-income products (savings accounts and
long-term certificates of deposits). This explains why European banks have extra resources.
This surplus, which is much larger than for American banks, is mostly reinvested in bonds.
Therefore, European banks are more vulnerable than American banks to the use of market values
to assess their investment portfolios. The securities/equity ratio is around 200% for the five
major US deposit banks, while it fluctuates between 600% and 1,200% for several European
banks.
Fourth, other differences between the EU and US banking sectors include the average duration
of the loan book, assets books and the degree of securitisation. In this respect, European banks’
balance sheets are more interest rate-sensitive than those of their American counterparts.
1 Bikker, J.A. and Wesseling, A.A.T., “Intermediatie, integratie en internationalisering: een overzicht van het Europese bankwezen”
(Intermediation, integration, and internationalisation: an overview of the European banking system), De Nederlandsche Bank, Monthly
Economic Bulletin, 67, 2003.42
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potentially adverse implications from a
financial stability perspective.
6.2 SUPERVISORY CONCERNS
Several supervisory concerns have been
expressed with reference to the introduction of
FFVA for banks. Many of the points raised
relate to the concerns that the volatility of bank
income might increase substantially, a point that
has also been discussed in previous sections.
Furthermore, the following additional concerns
of supervisors should be mentioned.
The first refers to the compatibility of FFVA
with dynamic provisioning. Some supervisory
authorities have recently introduced or are
considering introducing regulations on
dynamic (or statistical) provisioning, which
would be determined in accordance with
statistically expected losses as opposed to the
incurred loss model. The objective is to reduce
the cyclicality of loan loss provisions by way of
timelier provisioning when credit quality
deteriorates.  This approach gradually
recognises the increase in risk and spreads the
cost over a longer period, thus cushioning the
impact from loan impairment losses that are
recognised in a single accounting period.
The compatibility of such a supervisory
approach with FFVA – which in principle
would eliminate any need for specific
provisions as it already embodies expected
losses in the definition of expected cash flows –
is not clear. However, more forward-looking
provisioning seems to be compatible with the
current text of IAS 39.34
The second concern directly relates to the issue
of  compatibility  between the accounting
treatment and the supervisory requirements on
capital adequacy being defined in the New Basel
Accord. This issue is, of course, essential as
risk management systems in place for reporting
purposes should be deemed appropriate from a
supervisor’s point of view. Furthermore,
misalignments between the two approaches
would determine the need for banks to run
parallel reporting systems, unduly increasing
compliance costs. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision has started a dialogue
with the IASB on this topic.
Moreover, this compatibility issue with the
New Basel Accord raises an additional concern
from a financial stability perspective. The
almost contemporaneous implementation of the
new capital requirements and of FFVA, at least
for some items, might lead to a cumulative pro-
cyclical effect. Several commentators on the
New Basel Accord, including the ECB, have
stressed that the increased risk-sensitivity of
the new framework may cause capital
requirements to become binding during
downturns, with an adverse effect on the banks’
willingness to lend that may contribute to
further postponing economic recovery. If the
increase in credit risk is also coupled with a
downward correction in asset prices, banks that
are requested to apply FFVA more extensively
may be subject to a double squeeze, as the
capital requirement would increase while the
profits would be pushed downwards on account
of the valuation effect. This interaction should
be studied in greater depth before the
finalisation of the two reforms, in order to
identify possible solutions.
Last but not least, a point that ranks high among
supervisory concerns is the treatment of own
credit risk. Under FFVA a decline in the
creditworthiness of a bank would translate into
a requirement for higher risk spreads by the
investor. If the bank is asked to discount its
liabilities using its current funding rate, which
seems to be the preferred solution of accounting
standard-setters, a higher risk margin
determines a lower present (or fair) value. Since
this lower value is on the liabilities side of the
balance sheet, this translates in the P&L account
into a profit that, if not distributed, is added to
equity reserves (assuming assets constant).
Supervisors find it counter-intuitive that a
34 Matherat, S., 2003, “International accounting standardisation and
financial stability”, Financial Stability Review, Banque de
France, June, pp. 132-153.43
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decline in the creditworthiness of the bank
would translate into a profit and add up to
capital, thus allowing for a further expansion of
lending. The approach of standard-setters is
correct as long as things are viewed from the
shareholders’ perspective or in the event of a
bankruptcy or failure. Indeed, under limited
liability an increase in the default risk increases
the value of the shareholders’ put option.
However, it takes no account of the creditors,
who would be negatively affected by such a
development. Again, we find here a clear
example of the net asset value approach
followed by proponents of FFVA. In this case,
however, the final outcome is particularly
striking, as banks are by their very nature
institutions operating with a high leverage, and
an accounting approach that disregards
creditors’ concerns would be particularly
difficult to accept. It would certainly clash with
the supervisory assessment of banks, as
supervisors would never recognise as
regulatory capital the reserves created by a
revaluation of liabilities arising out of
diminished creditworthiness. On the other
hand, the application of FFVA to own credit
risk would discourage sound risk management
given that an upgrade in a credit rating would
result in the recognition of a loss. An
additional, more technical observation relates to
the composition of own funds, as changes in
own credit risk could translate into a swap
between tier 1 and tier 2 capital.35 Moreover, the
bank might be under increasing pressure to
distribute profits whereas the loss would have
to be booked directly to equity reserves, hence
reducing with full effect tier 1.
6.3 STATISTICAL CONCERNS
The statistical experts of the Eurosystem
assessed the possible implications of IAS on
the statistical requirements of the ECB,
including the statistical requirements related to
financial stability.
In terms of the recognition and measurement of
financial instruments, there appears to be a
35For example, a reduction in the value of subordinated debt
included in tier 2 would be transferred as a “revaluation gain” to
tier 1.
reasonably close correspondence between IAS
and the requirements for Money and Banking
Statistics (MBS) with regard to securities and
derivatives. However, the possible extension of
the application of FFVA to non-negotiable
financial instruments in the form of loans and
deposits would be contrary to the currently
applicable principle that these instruments be
recorded at nominal value in the statistical
balance sheet.
Users of the MBS seek to maintain loans/
deposits at nominal value. Nevertheless, they
have also expressed an interest in receiving data
on a fair value basis for banking analysis,
whilst acknowledging the subordinate status of
the requirement and the potential costs of
providing data on a dual valuation basis.
As a response to IAS 39, there is the intention
to change the ECB reporting requirements by
either imposing the reporting of nominal values
for stocks of loans and deposits or by extending
the requirement for flow adjustments to also
cover the revaluation of loans and deposits.
For the purposes of external statistics, euro area
financial accounts and government finance
statistics, it is expected that the IAS will
improve the overall data quality. However, the
wider use of FFVA could create inconsistencies
among statistics. Whereas the European System
of Accounts (ESA 95) currently requires
nominal values for deposits and loans,
corporations complying with the IAS will
report data on loans and deposits on a fair-value
basis and this could create some consistency
problems in the future, e.g. in the reconciliation
between MBS and Balance of Payments
statistics and for the presentation of financial
accounts statistics.
Of particular concern is the possibility that in
the EU listed companies could be permitted or
required to apply the IAS in their individual
accounts while non-listed companies could be44
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permitted or required to maintain the CAF.
Differences in the approaches taken by Member
States and the diversity in timing of
implementation at national level may have a
disruptive impact on the quality of euro area
statistics. Moreover, FFVA raises the more
general concerns of comparability of statistics
based on valuation criteria that are subject to
discretionary variables.
Finally, it should be stressed that to the extent
that financial reporting requirements diverge
from supervisory and statistical reporting
requirements, FFVA runs counter to the ECB
objective, and that of the European
Commission, to streamline the overall reporting
requirements of European companies.45
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Conclusions The analysis conducted in this paper should be
seen as a first step in a very complex issue that
requires significant additional research and
careful consideration of the policy options.
Although this analysis must be developed
further, some tentative conclusions can
nevertheless be drawn.
The analysis confirms the concerns that the
potential wider application of fair values could
unduly increase the volatility of banks’ balance
sheets, possibly reducing their ability to react to
adverse shocks. Indeed, for assets and
liabilities held to maturity, the resulting
volatility from the introduction of increased fair
values is purely artificial and ultimately
misleading given that, irrespective of the
interim fluctuations, the values will converge to
the same result as under the CAF.
Furthermore, the pro-cyclicality of bank
lending could be enhanced, especially if the
extension of fair values occurs with
approximately the same timing as the New Basel
Accord. In fact, in the presence of shocks
embodying a significant price component, such
as an interest rate shock, a real estate crisis or a
stock market crash, the immediate recognition
of unrealised value changes under fair value
accounting might aggravate the effects of the
shock. Banks may be encouraged to react by
panic selling and tightening lending standards,
thus contributing to a further deepening of the
crisis.
Increased use of fair values may also embody
incentives for banks to modify their portfolio
mix in a direction that may move them away
from their traditional liquidity transformation
role, thus reducing their contribution to
intertemporal smoothing. Notwithstanding that
the use of fair values may support increased
recourse to securitisation (and other risk-
transfer instruments), thus distributing risks
more evenly throughout the economy, the
shock-absorbing features of the financial
system might be lost. Indeed, once a systemic
disturbance unfolds, its macroeconomic effects
are likely to be more direct and severe.
7 CONCLUSIONS
Relevant supervisory concerns are such that
further work and adjustments are called for in
the current proposals of accounting standard-
setters (although the issue is not a move
towards FFVA, but encompasses a wider
application of fair values). The elaboration of
accounting standards should aim at achieving
consistency with internationally agreed
prudential standards, by recognising sound risk
management techniques. In this context, major
areas of divergence remain, namely with regard
to the treatment of own credit risk. From a
supervisory perspective it does not seem
reasonable to accept an accounting treatment of
bank’s liabilities that would generate profits
and possibly an increase of regulatory capital
due to a deterioration of the bank’s
creditworthiness. Moreover, the aim of
achieving consistency is also important from an
efficiency standpoint. If accounting and
prudential requirements diverge, and possibly
also move away from sound internal risk
management practices adopted by banks, the
compliance burden for credit institutions would
be unduly inflated. Consistency with statistical
requirements for monetary policy purposes
should also be considered more thoroughly.
Indeed, there is the risk that the very same
transaction would have to be recorded using
three or four different valuation criteria, thereby
increasing the reporting burden of banks.
The debate on macro-hedging mirrors the
difficulty of achieving a common understanding
between accounting standard-setters and the
industry. Although the new draft of IAS 39
recognises portfolio hedging of interest rate
risk and is considered an improvement with
respect to previous versions of the standard, it
still falls short of properly acknowledging
sound risk management practices followed by
banks and supported by supervisors. One of the
main concerns put forward relates to the
treatment of demand deposits. In particular, the
behavioural maturity of core demand deposits
differs from the contractual one, and banks take
this into account in their asset and liability
management practices. This seems sensible, as
banks collect savings from disparate depositors46
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and a sudden and contemporaneous withdrawal
of funds is highly unlikely, which allows banks
to engage in their typical liquidity and maturity
transformation function. While it is advisable
that accounting standards be aligned with best
practices in risk management, it is
understandable that some limits need to be
placed on bank discretion in the allocation of
deposits in maturity bands. In this context,
supervisory principles thus far developed could
provide relevant guidance, once again stressing
the benefits of closer coordination between
accounting standard-setters and supervisors.
The  empirical results of the investigation
conducted on share prices seem to indicate that,
by and large, the introduction of FFVA
standards had no significant impact on
volatility. The results, however, need to be
interpreted with caution for several reasons and
call for further research. First, the choice of the
cut-off dates on which banks changed from one
accounting standard to the other is far from
clear-cut. Second, towards the end of the 1980s
and in the early 1990s, the relative weight of the
trading book – to which the FFVA standard
applied – vis-à-vis the overall stream of income
was relatively modest.
Conversely, however, market discipline may be
significantly hampered by reliability and data
comparability issues. Indeed, the reliability of
fair values for several financial instruments is
highly questionable. In particular, market credit
spreads or internal models still seem to deliver
large and varied outcomes for instruments with
comparable risk features. The information
content of balance-sheet data could be adversely
affected. Furthermore, given the proliferation
of different internal valuation models, the
comparability of balance-sheet data across
financial institutions could be severely
jeopardised. Therefore, for the market to be in a
position to reap the benefits resulting from the
introduction of fair values, the existence of
deep and liquid markets and the use of generally
accepted models are considered an important
prerequisite.
Another important feature that the analysis
undertaken has revealed is the added value
gained from using FFVA for the treatment of
credit risk when compared to the CAF and
backward-looking  provisioning. In fact,
provisioning tends to be backward-looking in
the EU, since in several Member States
accounting rules compel banks to put aside
loan-loss provisions only when the losses have
already materialised. As a result, provisioning
practices tend to have a pro-cyclical impact, as
prudent provisioning does not constrain lending
behaviour in the upper part of the cycle and a
major correction usually occurs when the
economy enters into recession, with the result
that lending standards are further tightened.
In this context, the concern of accounting
standard-setters to limit the ability of managers
to manipulate the P&L by means of opaque
provisioning practices is understandable.
However, the analysis provided some
reassuring elements, not least from a financial
stability perspective. FFVA would introduce
forward-looking elements in the valuation of
credit risk and would allow for a timelier
recognition of the deterioration in asset quality.
This indication is conditional on the quality of
banks’ internal ratings systems and credit risk
models, which is not yet satisfactory.
Nevertheless, it is acknowledged that credit risk
models will develop, driven also by changes
under way in the supervisory approach to credit
risk, and they will be increasingly used for the
pricing of loans. Supervisors will validate these
valuations and there seems to be no strong
argument against reflecting such information in
the financial statements in order to provide bank
stakeholders with a more precise picture of their
bank’s quality, thus supporting market
discipline.
It should be emphasised that the analysis has
shown that the benefits of the forward-looking
elements of FFVA can also be achieved by
complementing the CAF with a forward-
looking provisioning system, which would be
currently more favourable from a financial
stability point of view.47
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36 Goldstein, M. and Turner, P., “Banking Crisis in Emerging
Economies: Origins and Policy Options”, BIS Economic Papers
No 46, pp. 17-18, Bank for International Settlements, October
1996.
An increasing reliance on fair values would also
pave the way for financial statements properly
accounting for derivatives transactions, thus
amending a major element of opaqueness in the
financial system that is presently hindering a
proper understanding of the real distribution of
risks to both market participants and public
authorities. This is an element that should be
strongly supported by the central banking and
supervisory community.
In any case, the outcome of the analysis
undertaken and the results presented in this
report clearly identify grounds for concern from
a financial stability point of view regarding the
transition from the CAF to a wider application
of fair values, in particular by means of a
general option for financial institutions to
measure at fair value any financial instrument.
As the changes may have a significant impact on
income volatility and pro-cyclicality, it cannot
be ruled out that a systemic disturbance hitting
the banking sector during the transition could
be unduly amplified. As a matter of fact,
systemic crises in the past were frequently
associated with significant reforms, liberalising
markets and a change in the environment in
which banks operated.36 The transition to the
new regime might be accompanied by
significant structural changes in bank behaviour
that are very difficult to foresee, and hence
some of the effects presented in this analysis
may not materialise. Nevertheless, the issues
raised are too important to be neglected and
should be addressed in a pre-emptive manner.48
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